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Abstract
In this dissertation, I shed light on the nexus between coups and trade. I address three
key questions. First, I examine whether all coup attempts, regardless of outcome,
have the same effect on international trade. I demonstrate that while failed coups
and increased coup risk negatively impact bilateral trade, the effect of successful
coups is mixed. Disaggregating trade along its intensive and extensive margins, I
also show that coups and increased coup risk largely influence bilateral trade through
their impact on the extensive margin of trade.
Second, I examine how the changing composition of international trade affects
coup propensity. I show that increased intra-industry trade is associated with a
reduction in the incidence of coups. I link this to reduced support for coups among
consumers and firms and anti-coup action taken by governments as intra-industry
trade increases. I also show that horizontal intra-industry trade has a bigger pacifying
effect on coups compared to its vertical counterpart, due to the differing firm-level
effects of these trades.
Third, I analyze the links between trade agreements and the survival of incumbents
at risk of coups. I demonstrate that contrary to assertions in the existing literature,
it is the impact of trade agreements that matter for the coup-proofing capability of
such agreements. I also show that these effects are expressed most strongly for coups
staged by regime outsiders.
The dissertation makes several contributions to the coup-trade literature. It is the
first to demonstrate that successful and failed coups can have very different impacts
on the trade of the coup state and that these effects can be countervailing along the
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intensive and extensive margins of trade. This challenge existing assumptions in the
literature that treat coup attempts homogeneously. It also demonstrates for the first
time that increased risk of coups dampen trade along both the intensive and extensive
margins of trade. This is important for domestic policy makers because it highlights
the importance of managing firm-level perceptions of coup risk.
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Extensive competition between various domestic political agents can precipitate re-
peated cycles of political instability. Prior research shows that such instability is
inimical to development (Acemoglu 2008; Fatas and Mihov 2013; Feng 1997). Devel-
opment needs a stable political atmosphere where social harmony, good governance
and rule of law thrive. An unstable political environment deters investment and slows
the pace of economic development. Moreover, poor economic performance has impor-
tant feedback effects on political stability as it may lead to government collapse and
political unrest. Consequently, understanding the links between economic growth,
development and political stability is critical.
The existing literature shows that trade is an important determinant of economic
growth and development. Countries that are open to trade tend to grow at a faster
rate, are more innovative, more productive, have higher income levels and provide
more opportunities for their people (Liu and Ornelas 2014; Melitz and Trefler 2012;
Peterson and Thies 2012). Trade also benefits domestic consumers, particularly low-
income households, by offering access to more affordable goods and services. Hence,
domestic conflict that reduces trade could have potentially important consequences
not only for consumer welfare but also for economic growth and development.
While the existing literature has examined how various forms of domestic conflict
(such as civil wars, terrorist attacks, insurgencies etc.) affect trade, we know rela-
tively little about the effect of one important form of domestic conflict - coups. It
is important to understand the relationship between coups and trade because prior
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research suggests that coups can have significant effects on trade volume (Fosu 2002;
Powell and Chacha 2016). In this dissertation, I aim to contribute to our understand-
ing of the relationship between trade and coups. In a series of essays, I address three
important aspects of the nexus between trade and coups.
In the first essay I take on the fundamental question of how coups affect interna-
tional trade. This is particularly important given the recent resurgence of scholarship
that aims to examine the links between coups and economic growth and development
(e.g. Dube et al. 2011; Kim 2014; Powell and Chacha 2016). These studies build
on prior work that examine how coups interact with trade dynamics to produce the
levels of growth and development witnessed in coup-prone states. However, this first
generation of studies do not differentiate between successful and failed coups, a major
shortcoming since the former results in regime change while the latter does not.
Additionally, prior studies have been limited to analysis of how actual coup events
affect trade. However, the economics literature presents strong evidence that at the
firm level, international trade decisions do not just respond to current events but
also to anticipated ones (e.g Gervais 2018; Gulen and Ion 2015; Handley and Limao
2015). This means that firms may not only be sensitive to current coup events but
also to potential coups. This possible link between coup risk and trade is completely
unexplored. I address these shortcomings by disaggregating coups into failed and
successful ones and capture the effect of coup expectations with a new coup risk
index. I also decompose aggregate trade along its intensive and extensive margins. I
draw on the emerging heterogeneous firms trade literature to show that failed coups
and increased coup risk both have significant negative effects on trade. However, the
effects of successful coups are mixed, possibly depending on post-coup trade policies.
I also demonstrate that successful and failed coups can have countervailing impacts
on trade along the intensive and extensive margins. This challenges the implicit
assumption of equivalency underlying studies that only analyze the aggregate effect
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of coup attempts on trade.
The second essay examines the link between intra-industry trade and coup at-
tempts. Classic trade typically involves the exchange of goods and services across
industries. For instance, the US and Europe import agricultural commodities from
developing countries and export manufactured industrial goods in return. However,
since the end of World War II, an increasing proportion of international trade has
been within, rather than between industries 1. Intra-industry trade (IIT) involves
the exchange of differentiated, often branded goods (such as domestically produced
automobiles) for foreign made ones. This intra-industry trade has expanded rapidly
in the last few decades, accounting for between 55% and 75% of international trade
(Alt et al. 1996; Milner 1999). In spite of this marked shift, literature on the political
consequences of this change in trade composition is only beginning to emerge. One
important stream of this emerging literature analyzes the effects of IIT on the political
behavior of states in the international arena (e.g. Kim and Wong 2015; Madeira 2016;
Osgood 2016; Peterson and Thies 2012; Thies and Peterson 2015). This literature
shows that IIT lowers resistance to liberalization and increases inter-state symme-
try of trade gains and opportunity costs. This contributes to cooperation between
states and fewer interstate conflicts. An unexplored dimension of this is whether the
pacifying effects of intra-industry trade extend to the domestic political environment.
To fill this gap, I analyze how intra-industry trade and its horizontal and vertical
components affect coups, an important form of domestic conflict.
This essay makes the case that increased intra-industry trade is associated with
reduced incidence of coups. I argue that intra-industry trade raises the opportunity
cost of coups for consumers, domestic firms and the government, incentivizing them
to limit support for coups or to pursue actions that keep coup propensity low. I test
these propositions for a global sample of countries and find robust empirical support.
1Albeit often among countries that have similar factor endowments.
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The results also show that increases in horizontal-IIT have a bigger pacifying effect
on coups than its vertical counterpart, due to the differing firm-level effects of these
trades.
The final essay analyses how trade agreements affect coup propensity. The post
cold war era has seen a spike in the number of countries entering into trade agree-
ments. Trade agreements have therefore become one of the most important economic
policy instruments for many government around the world. Recent scholarship on
trade agreements highlights the interesting observation that countries enter trade
agreements with more frequency than their economic benefits alone would warrant.
Some scholars explain this higher-than-expected participation in trade agreements as
a function of the potential effects that trade agreements have on prolonging incum-
bent survival in office, particularly incumbents at risk of overthrow through coups.
However, precisely how trade agreements aid the survival of at risk incumbents and
the exact mechanisms at play are still nebulous. Getting clarity on this issue is im-
portant because trade agreements are not primarily designed to lengthen incumbent
survival so if it has this effect in practice, the consequences are important. For one,
it could dampen the prospect of democratization if repressive autocratic regimes can
prolong their stay in office by reaping the benefits of multiple trade agreements. A
related unresolved question is this - if trade agreements do reduce coup risk, do they
all have this effect or do their coup-proofing benefits vary depending on the specific
actors involved in the coup? Moreover, do the coup-proofing effects of trade agree-
ments extend beyond differences in their design? In the final essay, I attempt to
provide answers to these questions.
I make the case that beyond merely entering into PTAs or even differences in
their design, it is the impact of these agreements on trade that determine their coup-
proofing benefits. I also contend that the coup-proofing capabilities of PTAs only
apply to coups staged by regime outsiders. Examining reciprocal PTAs involving 152
4
countries concluded between 1962 and 2014 along with commodity level trade data,
I find confirmatory results that are robust to a variety of controls, specifications and




International Trade In The Shadow of Coups
2.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence in scholarship examining the links between
coups and economic growth and development (e.g. Dube et al. 2011; Kim 2014; Powell
and Chacha 2016). Many of these studies highlight how coups are often disruptive to
productive economic activity and so are inimical to economic growth. These recent
studies extend prior work that examine the nexus between coups and one critical
ingredient of economic growth - international trade (e.g. Fosu 2002, 2003; O’Kane
1993). That branch of the literature has shed valuable light on how coups interact
with trade dynamics to produce the levels of growth and development witnessed
in coup-prone states. For instance, O’Kane (1993) argues that most coups are a
consequence of the government’s lack of political control over the fallout resulting
from domestic uncertainties created by shocks in world trade markets. Specialization
in and dependence on primary goods for exports leaves governments with very little
fiscal room maneuver in times of negative price shocks. In the face of high poverty
levels, even the most responsible governments are open to accusations of incompetence
and corruption, precipitating coups.
One shortcoming of this coup-trade literature (and much of the broader literature
on coups and economic growth) is that it is primarily concerned with the effect of
coup attempts as a whole. In effect, these studies treat successful and failed coups
alike. Unfortunately this overlooks one very important distinction between successful
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and failed coups - the former results in regime change and the later does not. This
distinction has important implications for the potential effects coups have on trade.
For one, the historical coup incidence record is replete with accounts of new coup
leaders reneging on debt servicing obligations, instituting income and export subsidies
and decreeing currency devaluations or abrogating previous ones. Such sweeping
policy reforms in the aftermath of successful coups may have a significant impact on
domestic demand conditions and the profitability of domestic and foreign firms that
engage in trade. On the other hand, failed coups are often not followed by sweeping
economic reforms but harsh retaliatory measures by the surviving regime as it goes
after the perpetrators of the abortive coup. Consequently, successful and failed coups
likely have very different consequences for the trade of the coup state, consequences
we miss when we fail to make the distinction between the two.
Related to this, previous studies have been exclusively confined to analysis of how
actual coup events affect trade. This limitation is unfortunate, particularly in light
of the myriad of studies that show that the firms base trade and investment decisions
not only on current events but also on anticipated future events (e.g Gervais 2018;
Gulen and Ion 2015; Handley and Limao 2015). This means that trade may not only
be responsive to coup events that have already happened but also to the risk of future
coups. This potential nexus between coup risk and trade is completely unexplored.
Moreover, on the trade side of the equation, analysis has focused exclusively on
aggregate trade. While this is useful, it ignores the fact that changes in trade can be
driven by changes in either trade per product (the intensive margin) or in the range
of goods traded (the extensive margin) or both. An analysis of the effect that coups
have on trade along these dimensions is important because an increase in the range
of traded goods is fundamentally important to the economy as an engine for growth.
Additionally, growth (or at least a maintenance) of trade per product is important
for sustained economic development.
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I aim to address these shortcomings in this paper. I disaggregate coups into failed
and successful ones and capture the effect of coup expectations with a new coup
risk index. I focus on the effect of coups and coup risk on foreign exports to the
coup state and decompose these exports into the range of products exported and
the amount exported per product. My theoretical framework draws on the emerging
heterogeneous firms trade literature to examine how coups and coup risk affect the
variable and fixed costs of market entry as well as domestic demand conditions. For
the empirical analysis, I use structural gravity models in a directed dyad framework
with a sample of 162 countries over the period 1962 - 2015.
The results show that failed coups and increased coup risk have significant neg-
ative effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade and on overall bilateral
exports. However, the effects of successful coups on trade are mixed, although they
generally lean negative. These results demonstrate for the first time that success-
ful and failed coups can have very different impacts on the trade of the coup state.
This challenges the implicit assumption of equivalency underlying studies that only
analyze the aggregate effect of coup attempts. The also demonstrate that increased
risk of coups dampens trade along both dimensions. Policy-wise, this is particularly
revealing because it suggests that the perception that certain countries are at high
risk for coups may undermine their efforts to develop through trade.
In the sections that follow, I discuss how coups and coup risk potentially affect
bilateral trade and its intensive and extensive margins. I then describe the data and
analytical approach. Results and conclusions follow that.
2.2 Coups And International Trade
A natural theoretical setting for linking the intensive and extensive margins of trade
to coups is the emerging heterogeneous firms trade theory literature. In contrast
to traditional trade models, these emphasize the importance of firm-level productiv-
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ity differences in trade patterns (see e.g. Bernard et al. 2007; Manova 2013; Melitz
and Trefler 2012). The incorporation of firm-level productivity differences into the
traditional trade models yield a decomposition of trade expansion into two distinct
dimensions - an increase in exports by firms that already export to the destination
market (the firm-level intensive margin) and the number of exporters selling in the
destination market (the firm-level extensive margin). When firms produce differenti-
ated goods, these firm-level margins translate into product-level margins, (the focus
of this study). This paper builds on recent studies that attempt to analyze the effect
of trade liberalization, in terms of reductions in the fixed and variable costs of trade,
on these product-level margins. One seminal contribution to this stream of the liter-
ature is Melitz (2003), who develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous
firms to analyze the intra-industry effects of international trade. His model shows
that exposure to trade induces only the most productive firms to enter the export
market while simultaneously forcing the least productive firms to exit.
Chaney (2008) extends this model, allowing for asymmetric trade barriers between
trade partners. Unlike earlier representative firm models (see e.g. Krugman 1979),
Chaney (2008) accounts for firm-level productivity differences as well as the costs of
entering export markets. The intuition behind the model is that because firms differ
in terms of their productivity and also due to the existence of fixed and variable
costs in exporting, only the most productive firms will find it profitable to export.
Critically, the profitability of exports differs by destination. This means that firms
generally prefer to export to countries that have higher demand and lower fixed and
variable costs as these present the biggest opportunities to maximize profits. Thus
for each export destination d, there is a productivity threshold that yields zero profits
from exports for firms in origin country o. The only firms in o that will have positive
profits from exporting to d will be firms that have productivity levels that exceed
this threshold. Hence, only a subset of firms in o will be exporters, with this subset
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varying with the characteristics of the specific destination market.
At the firm-level, a reduction in variable trade costs to a particular destination
increases the number of exports for each existing exporter and also increases the
number of exporters since the productivity threshold for profitability drops. On the
other hand, a reduction in fixed costs have little effect on existing exporters (since
they have already paid the fixed costs to be in the market) but induces new firms to
enter the market by lowering the productivity threshold. At the product-level, this
suggests that a reduction in variable cost will increase both exports per product as
well as the range of products exported whereas a reduction in fixed costs will increase
the range of products exported to o.
Against this background, we can view coups in the destination country as affecting
the fixed and variable costs associated with doing business there. Below, I detail how
failed and successful coups potentially affect these trade-related costs.
2.2.1 Failed Coups
Failed coups in the destination country directly affects trade costs (and by extension
the profits) of foreign exporter firms. Given that fixed-costs represent one-time sunk
costs associated with market entry, failed coups have very little direct effect on such
costs. The effects of failed coups on trade are more likely come through its effect on
variable (on-going) costs. In the aftermath of a failed coups, surviving incumbents
may crackdown on coup conspirators and their supporters. Cases of arbitrary arrests,
torture and summary executions are not uncommon. Surviving incumbents have also
been known to use the excuse of a failed coup to round up political opponents and
dissidents. The brutal crackdown on opposition supporters by the government of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the aftermath of the failed 2016 coup in Turkey serve
as a useful illustration. Failed coups could also degenerate into large scale violent
conflicts that can destroy trade facilitating infrastructure (ports, warehouses, roads,
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bridges, communication networks etc.). Violent failed coups could also destroy social
and private capital and result in curfews that restrict movements to certain hours or
create security concerns that make it hard for workers to report to work, possibly
shrinking incomes and associated consumer demand.
This has a direct effect on the variable costs of doing business in the coup country
for foreign exporters. For one, curfews and the heightened security environment in the
aftermath of failed coups could logistically complicate the movement of goods to shops
and markets or prolong the amount of time goods spend in ports and warehouses.
This constitutes an additional cost to firms for example through increased transporta-
tion expenses or the depreciation of the goods’ value while delayed in ports. Firms
may also have to hire additional security for warehouses and shops if failed coups
degenerate into widespread violence, further increasing variable costs. Even if failed
coups proceed without incidence, variable costs may still increase. Surviving incum-
bents could divert resources away from productive activities such as the maintenance
of power, transportation and communications infrastructure towards coup-proofing
activities such as procurement of weapons, paying soldiers and allied rebel groups.
In the long-run, this means firms will have to spend more to maintain transportation
trucks or acquire generators to make up for unreliable power from national grids.
Faced with these additional costs, existing exporters may be forced to adjust how
much of each product they export to the destination country (the intensive margin).
These additional costs also determine whether it is still profitable for firms to keep
exporting to the destination country. Firms on the margin may be forced out of the
market by these costs, reducing the range of products exported to the coup state (the
extensive margin). We therefore expect failed coups to have a negative effect on both
the intensive and extensive margins as well as the overall level of foreign exports to
the destination country. We can restate this as follows:
H1: Failed coups have a negative effect on total exports and a negative effect on both
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the intensive and extensive margins.
2.2.2 Successful Coups
Successful coups have the potential to directly affect both the variable and fixed costs
associated with trade, although their overall effect on trade is harder to predict ex
ante. On one hand, the variable costs associated with trade may increase in the
aftermath of successful coups if the new leaders pursue protectionist trade policies.
For instance, the new leaders may seek to build support by increasing tariffs to protect
domestic industries and raise revenue. These tariff increases impose additional costs
on existing foreign exporters who now have to either absorb the costs or pass them on
to consumers and potentially loose market share. Profits are hurt in both cases. The
new leaders may also pursue a policy of currency devaluations which make foreign
goods more expensive for domestic consumers, further reducing demand.
Successful coups may also threaten the stability of political institutions essential
for regulating markets and enforcing contracts. Foreign firms often rely on the threat
of litigation to protect property rights and ensure the fulfillment of contracts and other
obligations (Levchenko 2012). These institutions could be rendered ineffective as
guarantors of trade contracts in the aftermath of successful coups. As the institutional
mechanisms for contract enforcement and compensation become unreliable, foreign
firms face the threat of receiving no compensation for contract breaches by domestic
trade partners. This increases the cost for new and existing foreign firms of doing
business in the coup country as they have to take extra precautions to guard against
this possibility.
Furthermore, the efforts of coup makers to consolidate power and struggles by
ousted elites to regain power could create an unstable political and economic envi-
ronment that interrupts business operations. Domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms
associated with the previous leaders could also be targeted for nationalization by the
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new regime. The net effect of these disturbances is to increases both the fixed and
variable costs of doing business in the coup state. Faced with these cost increases,
existing firms are likely to cut back on export volumes, hurting the intensive margin
of trade. Decreased demand may also make it unprofitable for these firms to keep
exporting to the destination country and for new firms to enter the market. This
reduces the rage of products exported to the coup state, depressing the extensive
margin.
On the other hand, successful coups may hold great potential for trade. For
one, coups could remove long-term autocratic governments and usher in a period
of democratic reforms and transitions which boosts economic growth and incomes
(Derpanopoulos et al. 2016). Because coups are often launched against unpopular
governments, they could help ease political tensions and lower the incidence of re-
pression and human rights abuses. This improved political and security environment
could make it easier for domestic workers to get and keep jobs due to better freedoms
of movement, boosting incomes and demand.
In addition, the new coup leaders could launch a series of economic reforms that
increase the profitability of exporting there. For instance in Brazil, the new military
government moved swiftly to institute policies aimed at boosting exports after the
1964 coup that brought an end to the government of Joao Goulart (Mello 2010). These
policies are credited with kick-starting the stalled Brazilian economy, establishing the
country as a regional powerhouse.
Coups could also remove protectionist governments and dismantle inimical policies
that previously increased the cost of exporting there. For instance, before the 1973
Augusto Pinochet coup, Chile was a closed economy with very high trade tariffs and
other barriers to capital movements (Aroca and Hewings 2006). Immediately after
the coup, Pinochet moved to radically liberalize the economy through aggressive tariff
reductions, price and interest rate cuts (Lederman 2005). The change in government
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could also ease political tensions and improve the security situation that lowers the
cost of freight, insurance and other costs associated with exporting to the country.
Foreign firms could also benefit significantly from coups if their home government
was complicit in the coup. If the coup was engineered or backed by the home state
government, it is conceivable that the new rulers, as a reward for the assistance,
may offer preferential access to its markets for the country’s firms. It could also
reduce tariffs for their goods. Depending on the agreement reached with the coup
leaders prior to them usurping power, the trade concessions towards the backing state
could be substantial, encompassing not just trade but other flows such as government
contracts and procurement. Even without the prior backing of any foreign state,
coup leaders could unilaterally liberalize trade, reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers
to curry favor with major trading partners and the broader international community.
This is particularly likely if the coup leaders lack a solid domestic base of support.
Thus, successful coups potentially have significant effects on both the variable and
fixed costs of doing business in the coup state. Cost reductions increase exports along
both the intensive and extensive margins while cost increases will have the opposite
effect. However, whether costs increase or decrease depends on the specific actions
and policies adopted by new coup leaders in the aftermath of each successful coup.
This in itself depends on the specific circumstances surrounding each coup. This
makes it difficult to predict ex ante the exact effect that successful coups will have
on trade.
We can formalize this as:
H2: Successful coups could have a positive or negative effect on total exports as well
as on both the intensive and extensive margins.
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2.3 Coup Risk And Trade
While it is important to examine the impact of actual coup attempts on trade, it
is important to recognize that firms do not only respond to coup events but also to
expectations of potential coups. Several studies show that firms base key decisions
on how relevant factors are expected to affect revenues. For instance, Gervais (2018)
shows that firms that expect to face difficulty sourcing critical production inputs tend
to contract with multiple suppliers in order to limit the potential impact of these
anticipated disruptions on firm profits. Similarly, Baroudi (2017) shows that faced
with the increased likelihood of an unfavorable change to the political environment,
firms are likely to purchase political risk insurance to limit variability to profits.
Expected coups likely affect trade through their effect on generating policy uncer-
tainty. As highlighted above, successful coups could have either a positive or negative
effect on exports depending on the post-coup policies of the new leaders. Failed coups
could spark a crackdown that impedes economic activity.1 Because it is difficult to
predict whether coup attempts will succeed or fail (and if successful what policies are
likely to follow), their possibility creates enormous uncertainty for existing firms that
do business in the coup state as well as for potential firms contemplating entering that
market. How these firms deal with this uncertainty is therefore critical to determining
the effect that coup expectations have on exports and its constituent margins.
Greenland et al. (ming) provide a useful theoretical framework for analyzing how
uncertainty affects the business decisions of firms. They build on prior models that
show that when market entry costs are sunk or at least partially irreversible, un-
certainty about future policies induce prospective firms to delay entry until the un-
certainty resolves (see e.g. Bernanke 1983; Handley 2014; Handley and Limao 2015).
This suggests that new firms prefer to delay incurring the sunk costs associated with
1It is possible that failed coups may also spur economic reforms that boost trade (although this
is very rare)
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exporting to an uncertain policy environment. Greenland et al. (ming) adapt these
general equilibrium frameworks to account for the effect of uncertainty on the mar-
gins of trade. They show that as policy uncertainty causes firms to delay entry into
new markets, the range of potential products exported to the new market decreases,
negatively impacting the extensive margin.
They also show that the intensive margin is primarily influenced by changes in
future demand conditions. This is because changes in demand directly affect firms’
choices in relation to product prices and quantities exported. Expectations of de-
creased future demand induce existing firms to reduce prices or cut exported quan-
tities. Decreased demand also means that exporting to the coup country may no
longer be profitable for some firms, who may drop out of the market. Expected fu-
ture decrease in demand therefore has a negative effect on the intensive margin of
trade.
We can apply these insights to determine the effect of potential coups on trade.
The possibility of a coup introduces uncertainty because a coup could for instance
usher in leaders who may radically change trade policy in unanticipated ways. This
uncertainty causes a decrease in the number of potential foreign firms willing to do
business in the coup country, decreasing the range of products exported and conse-
quently depressing trade along the extensive margin. Coups also hold the potential of
dampening future consumer demand through the mechanisms outlined earlier. This
induces existing foreign exporters to take measures aimed at limiting potential vari-
ation in profits, including limiting current exports to the coup country. This reduces
exports per product and dampens trade along the intensive margin. Overall, an in-
crease in the risk of future coups should have a negative effect on the intensive and
extensive margins of trade as well as the overall level of trade.
We can formalize this as:
H3:Increased coup risk has a negative effect on total exports and a negative effect on
16
both the intensive and extensive margins.
2.4 Data and Analysis
I aim to test hypotheses that while the effect of successful coups are ambiguous, failed
coups and increased coup risk have negative effects on bilateral exports along both
the intensive and extensive margins. Towards this end, I draw on a global sample of
162 countries over the period 1962-2015 in a directed dyad empirical framework.
2.4.1 Coups
To capture actual coups, I use two dichotomous variables. The first - Coup Failure
- is coded 1 for years in which there were failed coup attempts (including multiple
failures) and 0 otherwise. The second variable - Coup Success - is coded 1 if an
attempted coup is successful and 0 otherwise. Powell and Thyne (2011) from whom
I obtain coup data define a coup as an “illegal and overt attempt by the military
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the siting executive”. In this
vein, coups “succeed” if the putschists are able to hold on to power for at least seven
consecutive days and fail otherwise.
2.4.2 Measuring Coup Risk
Coup risk is commonly conceptualized as capturing the opportunity for launching
coups. This flows from the distinction between the motives for coups and the op-
portunity for staging coups (e.g. Finer 1988; Hibbs 1973; Huntington 2006; Luttwak
1968). For instance, Finer (1988) links coup occurrence to factors that create the
necessary opportunities for military intervention such as civilian dependence on the
armed forces, crisis in the domestic polity e.g. power vacuums and the popularity of
the military. Similarly, Zimmermann (2013) links coups to jostling between “push”
and “pull” factors. Push factors act on the motives that coup entrepreneurs have to
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stage coups whilst pull factors create the opportunity for intervention. Also, Casper
and Tyson (2014) argue that elites with pre-existing motives to stage coups use the
opportunity created by citizen protests to coordinate for coups.
It is this distinction between motives and opportunities for coups that Belkin and
Schofer (2003) take issue with. They point out that coup risk and the opportunity for
launching a coup are not necessarily equivalent. They do away with the motives vs.
opportunities framework, choosing instead to draw on the distinction between “struc-
tural” and proximate “triggers” of coups. They conceptualize coup risk as reflecting
the background latent factors that make coups possible rather than the immediate
proximate causes that trigger any one particular coup. They argue that coup risk
is the result of deep structural societal, governmental and cultural attributes e.g.
regime legitimacy and strength of civil society. This is separate from short-term fleet-
ing crises that tend to trigger specific coups e.g. individual officers grievances, citizen
protests and government crisis. Thus, in their conceptualization, it is the combined
effect of structural risk and short-term triggers that lead to coups. In the absence
of structural factors, the triggers alone cannot lead to coups. The structural factors
determine the underlying coup risk whilst the triggers determine the timing of the
coup.
Belkin and Schofer (2003) suggest three dimensions along which to measure coup
risk - a) the strength of civil society b) regime legitimacy and c) the impact of past
coups. Following their conceptualization of coup risk, I capture the strength of civil
society using the Core Civil Society (CCS) Index from the Varieties of Democracy
dataset (Bernhard et al. 2015). The CCS index captures the robustness of civil so-
ciety groups i.e. the autonomy of civil society groups from state control and the
ability of citizens to freely pursue their collective interests. The index is based on a
battery of responses to questions about various aspects of civil society organizations
by country experts. These questions examine the ability of civil society groups to
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organize free of state constraints and how engaged the general citizenry is in civil
society organizations. The index takes into account the existence of laws that reg-
ulate the entry and exist of civil society organizations into the public space as well
as whether there is direct state repression of civil society organizations and political
activists. The index also includes indicators for civil society consultation, organiza-
tional characteristics and whether particular groups are subject to discrimination in
civil society. The index ranges between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating a more
robust civil society.
Following Belkin and Schofer (2003), I capture regime legitimacy using measures
of competitiveness and the degree of regulation of the political system taken from
the Polity IV project (Marshall 2017). Competitiveness captures the extent to which
“alternatives preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political
arena” and is a five-category index that ranges from “repressed” in which no significant
oppositional activity is present to “competitive”, where relatively stable and enduring
secular political groups regularly compete for political influence. The regulation of
participation index captures the extent to which there are binding rules on when,
where and how political preferences are expressed. This is a five-category index
that ranges from “unregulated” where political participation is fluid with no enduring
national political organizations and no systemic regime controls on political activity
to “regulated” where political groups regularly compete for political influence and
position with little use of coercion.
To capture the effect of past coups, I rely on data from Powell and Thyne (2011).
For each country-year, I include the time elapsed since the last coup attempt. This
indicator of the duration between attempts is informationally rich as it incorporates
information on both the incidence and frequency of coups.
I employ a Bayesian modeling approach and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
models to estimate the index. I use Bayesian factor analysis which allow the data to
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determine what weights are assigned to each component of the index as part of the
estimation process. In essence, this approach lets the “data speak” in terms of which
of the individual components have the biggest effect on latent coup risk. This frees
us from having to arbitrarily assign weights since the existing literature provides very
little guidance in terms of the relative technical importance of each component vari-
able. The estimation model also provides greater information about the uncertainty
around the resulting index value for each country-year. This information is important
because it provides an indication of the precision of the estimated index and allows
other researchers who may use the index to take the uncertainty into account in their
own work.
To estimate the latent coup risk from the observed input variables, we assume that
c denotes an N ⇥ J matrix of observed values along J dimensions by N countries.
We also assume that the elements of c are derived from an N ⇥ J matrix of c*
latent variables along with a collection of cut points that distinguish between the
variables. If we set J = 1,2,3,....,J index of observed variables and i =1,2,3,....,N
index of observations, the association between the observed component variables and
the latent values c* can be modeled using a Bayesian factor analysis model:
c⇤i = LFi + #i, i = 1, 2, 3, ....,N (2.1)
Where c⇤i is the J vector of latent coup risk specific to observation i, L is a J ⇥
K matrix of factor loadings (discrimination scores), Fi is a K vector of factor scores
unique to each observation i and #i ⇠ N(0,Y) is a J vector of disturbances.2 For
the estimation, the continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and
standard deviation of 1. To help identify the model, I constrain the component
variables to have a negative effect along with relatively uninformative priors for the
error variances. This corresponds with our theoretical expectations that increases in
2See Quinn (2004) for a useful review of the models employed here.
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each of the component variables is negatively associated with latent coup risk.
The estimated coup risk index captures the likelihood of a coup attempt. To get
a sense of the index, Figure 1 is a plot of the top 20 countries in terms of coup risk for
2015. The panel shows the point estimates along with the 95% confidence intervals.
The plot shows that in 2015, Afghanistan, Somalia and Papua New Guinea were the
top three countries in terms of latent coup risk i.e. these countries had the most









































−1 0 1 2 3
Coup Risk
Figure 2.1: Estimated Coup Risk Scores
2.4.3 Decomposing Trade Flows
Our theoretical framework is micro-founded on decisions made by firms concerning
the range and quantity of export products. To capture these product-level dynamics,
I employ relatively fine grained trade data disaggregated to the commodity level
using the Standard International Trade Classification level 5 (SITC-5). Trade data
comes from UN COMTRADE (2018). For any origin-destination pair, I decompose
bilateral trade flows into the range of products exported (the extensive margin) and
the amount exported per product (the intensive margin). I follow Dutt et al. (2013)
and estimate the extensive margin as a count of the number Nod of products exported
from country o to country d and the intensive margin as the average value of exports
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The overall volume of bilateral exports is thus given by the product of these
margins:
Xod = Nod ⇥ x¯od (2.3)
We estimate separate gravity equations for each of the these margins along with total
exports. Gravity models are traditionally implemented by taking the natural logs of
the dependent variable and so the sum of the logged margins should equal the log of
the aggregate bilateral exports. In the same vein, the sum of the estimated coefficients
for any independent variable for the two margins should equal the coefficient of that
variable in the total exports model.4
2.4.4 Analytical Approach








In the above expression, the value of exports from o to d at time t is represented
by Xodt, Yot and Xdt are the value of the origin country’s total production and the
destination country’s total consumption respectively. If trade is balanced, the level
of consumption is the same as the level of production in each country.5 The mutual
resistance terms in the equation are Wot and Fdt and represent a weighted sum of
3An alternative operationalization is to use weighted scores for the extensive and intensive mar-
gins as in Feenstra and Kee (2008) and Greenland et al. (ming). The difference between that
operationalization and the one used here is that the traded products are assigned time-invariant
weights for each destination country d proportional to the total value of exports from all d ’s trad-
ing partners. Theoretically, this operationalization and the one used here should produce the same
results (Dutt et al. 2013).
4See Appendix A of Dutt et al. (2013) for a derivation of the extensive and intensive margins as
used here.
5That is, Xdt = Ydt ⇥ fodt represents trade barriers between the two countries
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trade costs that separate each country from all its trade partners. In other words, Fdt
represents trade costs faced by the destination country when importing from other
countries while Wot represents the trade costs incurred by the exporting country in
selling to importers (Feenstra and Kee 2008). We can transform the above structural
equation into a linear version as:
ln(Xodt) = b0 + b1CoupRiskt 1 + b2CoupSuccesst 1 + b3CoupFailuret 1+
b4ln(GDPot) + b5ln(GDPdt) + b6EIAodt + b7ln(TICod) + b8MRot+
b9MRdt + zod + ht + ln(eodt)
(2.5)
CoupRiskt 1 is the level of coup risk in the destination market d lagged by a year.
CoupSuccesst 1 and CoupFailuret 1 are dichotomous variables coded 1 for successful
and failed coups in the destination country in the previous year respectively.
I include a battery of standard gravity model covariates taken from the CEPII
dataset (Mayer and Zignago 2011).6 GDP captures a country’s level of production
in year t while EIAodt captures time-varying trade costs and is a vector of two di-
chotomous variables each coded 1 for years in which country o and d are a) part of
a regional trade agreement and b) are members of the World Trade Organization.
TICod captures time-invariant trade costs and is a vector of characteristics specific to
each dyad pair. This vector includes a) geographic distance between the capitals (or
most populous cities) of the two countries b) a common border indicator c) a com-
mon official language indicator (by share of the population) d) dummy for colonial
ties between the two countries and f) whether the destination country is landlocked.
I also control for multilateral resistance to trade between the dyad pair. Multilat-
eral resistance reflects the fact that trade between any origin-destination pair is not
solely a bilateral phenomena. It is also influenced by the multilateral setting within
which trade takes place. The multilateral resistance terms capture both the openness
6Summary descriptive statistics are in Appendix Table A.1
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of the importing country to exports from all other countries and the openness of the
world to the exporter’s goods. Omitting these multilateral resistance terms could
potentially bias estimates of trade costs towards zero (Anderson and Van Wincoop
2004). I follow Yotov et al. (2016) and estimate multilateral resistance as the “re-
moteness index” of the importer and exporter. Thus, multilateral resistance terms














Where Distod, Idt, Eot and Yt represent bilateral distance, importer trade expendi-
ture, exporter trade output and world trade respectively. I also include dyad fixed
effects, zod, in all estimated models. As these fixed effects capture observed (and
unobserved) time-invariant trade mediators, all dyad time-invariant variables drop
out of the models due to potential collinearity. That is, the TICod term (distance,
contiguity, common language, colonial ties etc.) drops out of the estimated mod-
els. I also include year fixed effects, ht, to account for the potentially confounding
effect of changing global trends in international trade over time. To minimize the
likelihood of biased and inconsistent estimates due to heteroskedasticity and possible
serial correlation in the error term, robust standard errors clustered at the dyad level
are estimated for all models. In addition, for the main models, I follow Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) and estimate Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) models
as an additional robustness check.
2.5 Results
We begin by estimating a basic gravity model with standard covariates for gravity
models along with indicators for multilateral resistance (but without controls for
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dyad and year fixed effects). Due to space constraints, we relegate this standard
model to the appendix (Table A.2). We estimate one model for each of our three
dependent variables (total exports, the intensive and extensive margins) across our
three variables of interest (coup success, coup failure and coup risk). All standard
covariates are significant at conventional levels and have the expected signs. Focusing
on Models 1 and 4, the estimate of the effect of distance is statistically significant at
all conventional level and is exactly equal to the benchmark estimate of -1.00 that
Head and Mayer (2014) document. This confirms that distance is indeed a significant
deterrent to global bilateral trade. Being members of the WTO, being part of a
free trade agreement, sharing a common border, language, currency and having a
colonial relationship all significantly increase bilateral trade. As expected, being a
landlocked country has the effect of decreasing trade with other states. We would
expect the coefficients on the multilateral resistance terms to be positive (indicating
remote countries trade more with each other) but are negative, possibly because of
unobserved time-invariant dyad effects. However, with an adjusted R2 = 0.63, this
basic specification delivers the standard strong fit that is commonly found in many
empirical gravity models in the literature (Yotov et al. 2016). Overall, the gravity
estimates obtained here closely match those obtained in many other previous studies
and therefore establish the representativeness of our sample countries.
We now move on to our main specification which includes controls for dyad and
year fixed effects. As previously highlighted, the inclusion of dyad fixed effects im-
plicitly accounts for all observed and unobserved time-invariant dyad characteristics
(distance, contiguity, colonial relations etc.) and so those drop out of the model while
the year fixed effects help account for changing global trade trends.
The results are in Table 2.1. Successful coups significantly increase exports along
the intensive margin (model 2) while decreasing it along the extensive margin (model
3). Policy changes after successful coups may force some existing firms out of the
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market, decreasing trade along the extensive margin. Remaining producers may then
increase their exports to the coup state in a bid to capture the market left behind
by the exited firms, potentially increasing trade along the intensive margin. These
countervailing effects potentially explain why the overall effect of successful coups
on exports is not statistically significant (model 1). Comparatively, failed coups are
more damaging to trade, decreasing both the intensive and extensive margins as well
as overall exports (models 1-3). The crackdown on political opponents, army purges
and arbitrary arrests that tend to follow failed coup attempts may increase costs,
forcing exporters to cut back on products and quantities exported.
Increased coup risk has a strong negative effect on foreign exports to the coup
state (model 4). It significantly decreases trade along the extensive margin (model
6), possibly as a result of attempts by existing firms to limit their exposure to the
coup state in the event the coup materializes. Increased coup risk also decreases trade
along the intensive margin (model 5), although this effect does not rise to conventional
levels of statistical significance.
All other control covariates are statistically significant and in line with theoret-
ical expectations. Particularly, after controlling for dyad and year fixed effects, the
multilateral resistance terms assume the expected positive coefficients for total trade
(models 1 and 4). In addition, the adjusted R2 for all estimated models are higher
than those for the basic specification, indicating the superiority of the current speci-
fication.
For robustness, I re-estimate all the models using Poisson-Pseudo Maximum Like-
lihood (PPML). The PPMLmodel allows us to estimate our gravity model in its native
multiplicative format, without having to resort to a log-linearized specification. This
is particularly useful in countering possible heteroskedasticity in the log-linearized
model (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). However, the dependent variables are different in
the sense that while the traditional gravity specification estimates the log of trade
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Table 2.1: Structural Gravity Models
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1 0.01 0.04⇤  0.02⇤
( 0.04, 0.07) ( 0.005, 0.08) ( 0.05, 0.002)
Coup Failuret 1  0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤⇤  0.04⇤⇤⇤
( 0.14,  0.03) ( 0.10,  0.004) ( 0.06,  0.01)
Coup Riskt 1  0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.01  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.13,  0.04) ( 0.05, 0.02) ( 0.10,  0.05)
ln(GDP)o 1.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤ 1.06⇤⇤⇤ 1.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤ 1.06⇤⇤⇤
(1.47, 1.66) (0.44, 0.58) (1.01, 1.11) (1.47, 1.66) (0.44, 0.58) (1.01, 1.11)
ln(GDP)d 1.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤ 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤⇤
(0.95, 1.08) (0.35, 0.43) (0.59, 0.66) (0.94, 1.06) (0.35, 0.43) (0.58, 0.64)
WTO Membero 0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.02, 0.16) ( 0.10, 0.01) (0.11, 0.17) (0.02, 0.16) ( 0.10, 0.01) (0.11, 0.17)
WTO Memberd 0.29⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.29⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.23, 0.35) (0.10, 0.18) (0.11, 0.18) (0.23, 0.35) (0.10, 0.18) (0.12, 0.19)
ln(MR)o 0.50⇤⇤⇤  0.06⇤ 0.56⇤⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤⇤  0.06⇤ 0.56⇤⇤⇤
(0.42, 0.58) ( 0.12, 0.002) (0.52, 0.60) (0.41, 0.58) ( 0.12, 0.002) (0.52, 0.60)
ln(MR)d 0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤
(0.14, 0.22) ( 0.24,  0.18) (0.37, 0.41) (0.14, 0.22) ( 0.24,  0.18) (0.37, 0.41)
N 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054
R2 0.84 0.71 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.88
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.70 0.87 0.83 0.70 0.87
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
flows, the PPML examines trade flows in levels. As a result, whereas the sum of the
covariates in the log of the two margins will equal the effect on log trade, this will
not be the case in the PPML specification.
The results of the PPML specifications are presented in appendix Table A.3.
In line with the results discussed above, the estimates show that successful coups
significantly decrease trade along the extensive margin while increasing it along the
intensive margin (although this effect is not significant) (models 2 and 3). Overall,
they tend to depress total exports, although this effect does not rise to conventional
levels of statistical significance (model 1). Failed coups significantly decrease both
total exports and the extensive margin while insignificantly increasing it along the
intensive margin (models 1-3). Increased coup risk has a negative effect on total
exports, with the bulk of the significant effects coming through the extensive margin.
Overall, the results of the PPML specification are broadly in line with our preferred
log-linear specification.
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2.5.1 Accounting for Importer Idiosyncrasies
While the results presented in Table 2.1 are consistent with our theoretical expecta-
tions, it might be useful to include additional controls to limit any spurious effects.
For one, it is possible that our indicator of coup risk is simply picking up the effect of
general political instability (and hence the volatility of trade policy) in the destina-
tion country. Indeed, there is evidence in the existing literature that countries with
unstable trade policies tend to attract less trade and investment (Handley and Limao
2015; Howell and Chaddick 1994; Levchenko 2012). Failure to account for this could
potentially bias our estimates. In the same vein, it is possible that the probability of
coup attempts are tied to the level of constraints on the chief executive (Powell 2012;
Sudduth 2017). The estimated effect of coups could therefore be biased if we fail to
properly account for this.
To address these issues, I include a control for the feasibility of policy change,
Polcon. This indicator is developed by Henisz (2002) and captures the extent to which
a change in the preferences any one political actor could lead to an unanticipated
change in government policy. The index captures the effect of political instability
associated with the number of independent branches of the government that have
veto power over policy change. It also accounts for the presence of upper and lower
houses of the legislature (more branches increase executive constraints) and the extent
of preference heterogeneity within the branches of the legislature among others. The
index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating more political constraints and
thus a lower probability of policy change.
Previous studies also show that the potential for sanctions has an important de-
terrent effect on bilateral trade (Early 2012; Thies and Peterson 2015). To the extent
that successful coups attractive punitive sanctions from trading partners and the in-
ternational community, our coup risk indicator may be picking up some of the effect
of anticipated sanctions. In other words, there is a potential positive relationship
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between coup risk and the possibility of sanctions and so firms may hesitate to do
business in countries that may likely become targets for sanctions in the near future.
If this is true, our coup risk indicator may pickup some of this hesitancy. This could
bias our estimates. To account for this possibility, I include sanctioned, a dichoto-
mous variable coded 1 for years in which the destination country is under sanctions.
Sanctions data comes from the TIES dataset (Morgan et al. 2014).
Relatedly, bilateral trade flows may be influenced by the foreign policy orientation
of the destination country. Governments that have a general “anti-west” orientation
or have a low adherence to western/neoliberal norms may be less likely to attract
new trade and investment from foreign firms. These governments may also be simul-
taneously more politically unstable and coup-prone. This could bias the estimates
of our coup covariates. To account for the foreign policy orientation of host govern-
ments, particularly towards the US-led global liberal order, I use the ideal point index
developed by Bailey et al. (2017). Their index draws on a state’s voting record in
the UN General assembly to make inferences about the state’s general foreign pol-
icy preferences. The index is constructed to minimize noise by using information on
the content of the UN’s agenda documents, making these estimates comparable over
time. Higher values of the index indicate greater alignment of a state’s foreign policy
preferences with those of the United States.
Table 2.2 presents the results of this exercise. Accounting for the above potentially
confounding factors produces results that are largely consistent with our baseline
results. However, successful coups now have a negative effect on total exports and
along the intensive margin (although this effect is insignificant). Failed coup and
increased coup risk continue to have negative effects on total exports and along both
dimensions, although the magnitudes of these effects are slightly less than those of
our baseline results.
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Table 2.2: Structural Gravity Models - Accounting for Political Stability, Sanctions
and Idealpoint
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1  0.10⇤⇤⇤  0.03  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.17,  0.03) ( 0.09, 0.03) ( 0.10,  0.04)
Coup Failuret 1  0.07⇤  0.04  0.03⇤⇤
( 0.15, 0.005) ( 0.10, 0.03) ( 0.07,  0.0003)
Coup Riskt 1  0.06⇤  0.01  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.11, 0.002) ( 0.05, 0.04) ( 0.08,  0.02)
ln(GDP)o 1.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 1.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤
(1.60, 1.85) (0.54, 0.72) (1.04, 1.15) (1.60, 1.85) (0.54, 0.72) (1.04, 1.15)
ln(GDP)d 0.89⇤⇤⇤ 0.34⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 0.88⇤⇤⇤ 0.34⇤⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.82, 0.96) (0.29, 0.39) (0.51, 0.58) (0.81, 0.95) (0.29, 0.39) (0.50, 0.58)
WTO Membero  0.02  0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.02  0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09, 0.05) ( 0.16,  0.04) (0.05, 0.12) ( 0.10, 0.05) ( 0.16,  0.04) (0.05, 0.12)
WTO Memberd 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.26, 0.39) (0.13, 0.23) (0.10, 0.17) (0.26, 0.39) (0.13, 0.23) (0.10, 0.17)
ln(MR)o 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤
(0.58, 0.81) ( 0.01, 0.16) (0.56, 0.67) (0.58, 0.81) ( 0.01, 0.16) (0.56, 0.67)
ln(MR)d 0.03  0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.03  0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤
( 0.01, 0.07) ( 0.30,  0.24) (0.28, 0.32) ( 0.01, 0.07) ( 0.30,  0.24) (0.28, 0.32)
Polcond 0.12⇤⇤ 0.01 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.03, 0.21) ( 0.06, 0.08) (0.06, 0.15) (0.04, 0.23) ( 0.06, 0.08) (0.08, 0.17)
Sanctionedd  0.02  0.02⇤ 0.003  0.02  0.02⇤ 0.005
( 0.06, 0.01) ( 0.05, 0.004) ( 0.01, 0.02) ( 0.05, 0.02) ( 0.05, 0.004) ( 0.01, 0.02)
Idealpointd 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.07, 0.16) (0.01, 0.07) (0.05, 0.09) (0.07, 0.16) (0.01, 0.07) (0.05, 0.09)
N 491,919 491,919 491,919 491,919 491,919 491,919
R2 0.86 0.74 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.90
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.73 0.89 0.85 0.73 0.89
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
2.5.2 Accounting for Endogeneity
While we analyze the effect of coups and coup risk on trade, it is equally possible
that trade influences the likelihood of coups and coup risk. In fact, the capitalist
peace literature suggests that increasing economic ties between states can prompt
belligerents in civil conflict to find peaceful resolutions to their disputes. Extending
this to coups, it is possible that as states trade more with the rest of the world, the
opportunity costs of domestic political upheaval is raised. This increased potential
for economic losses and damaged economic reputations could influence potential coup
makers to use constitutional means to resolve their disputes with the incumbent
(Powell and Chacha 2016).
The conventional approach to dealing with such potential endogeneity is to use
30
instrumental variables but given our multiple dependent variables, finding unique
instruments may prove insurmountable. In any case, the validity of any instruments
can always be called into question. In lieu of the instrumental variable approach,
I attempt to provide a more direct test of the causal mechanism underlying our
theoretical framework. In the model, coup risk affects trade by creating uncertainty
regarding the future direction of trade policy. This induces firms to precautionarily
delay making the sunk or partially irreversible costs associated with entering a foreign
market. This suggests that the effect of coup risk is increasing in the size of market
entry costs i.e. coup risk has a more detrimental effect on trade as market entry costs
increases. Providing a direct test of this mechanism should increase confidence that
coup risk does indeed affect bilateral trade primarily through the extensive margin.
To test this proposition, we use data on the number of start-up procedures required
to register a business from the World Bank’s Doing Business survey project (2013).
Here, start-up procedures refer to all necessary processes required to start a business
in the destination country. This index captures the number of official interactions
required to obtain the necessary permits and licenses and to complete all inscriptions,
verifications and notifications to start operations. We use this index as a simple
indicator of the sunk costs foreign firms incur in entering the destination market.
The index ranges from 1 to 21 but exhibits considerable variation across countries
over time. We exploit this variation to test the underlying causal mechanism of our
theoretical framework by interacting this index with our measure of coup risk. To
ease interpretation, I transform the index into three categorical bins. Countries with
7 or fewer start-up processes are tagged as “low cost” locations whereas those with
15 or more processes are tagged as “high cost”. The baseline category are medium
cost countries - those with between 8 and 14 processes. We would expect coup risk
to have a higher dampening effect on trade for countries that have higher start-up
processes.
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The results of this exercise is presented in appendix Table A.4. The estimated
results show that for countries in the low cost category, a 1-unit increase in coup
risk decreases exports by 0.01%. In comparison, when entry costs are high, a 1-
unit increase in coup risk decreases exports by 0.12%, a difference of 0.11 percentage
points. If we assume that trade between a typical country pair is $500 million per
year, this means compared to a low cost location, a high cost location will see about
$55 million less trade per year for a 1-unit increase in coup risk. Importantly, the
results show that this dynamic is driven mainly by coup risk’s effect on the extensive
margin of trade. This lends strong support to the hypothesized causal dynamics of
our theoretical framework.
For actual coup attempts, I run additional models that estimate the effect of
trade on coups. These models have lagged exports as the explanatory variable with
coup attempts as the dependent variable (I also estimate models with coup risk as
the dependent variable). An insignificant effect of exports on the coup attempts
would provide further evidence that endogeneity does not pose a serious threat to our
inferences here. The results of this exercise are presented in the appendix Table A.5.
The results show that a 1% increase in bilateral exports increases coup risk in the
destination country by 0.02 points and the odds of a coup attempt by 0.07 points.
However, none of these effects are statistically significant. This is true even when we
control for common covariates of coups such as GDP per capita, political constraints
and population size. Thus, while endogeneity between trade and coups potentially
poses a challenge to inference, it does not appear to be a particularly serious concern
here.
2.5.3 Allowing for Trade Adjustment Lags
Finally, we allow for the possibility that the adjustment of bilateral trade flows to
changes in coup risk or the occurrence of coups may not be instantaneous. Because
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our estimates are based on observations pooled over consecutive years, the effect of
coup risk and coups may be understated if they only kick-in after a few years or are
amplified with time. To address this potential concern, other researchers have used
interval data instead of data pooled over consecutive years (e.g. Olivero and Yotov
(2012); Yotov et al. (2016)). I follow this approach here and estimate dynamic gravity
models with 3-year and 5-year interval trade data. To save space, the results of this
exercise are presented in the appendix (Table A.6and Table A.7). The results are
largely consistent with those presented here - failed coups and increased coup risk
have negative effects on overall exports and along both dimensions while the effect of
successful coups are mixed.7.
To further increase confidence in our results, I also estimate models that include
lagged values of the dependent variables as explanatory variables. I estimate two
different specifications, one that includes dyad and year-fixed effects and one without
these fixed effects. These models are presented in appendix Table A.8 and Table
A.9. The results are largely consistent with our baseline results.
Overall, the results presented here provide broad support for our theoretical ex-
pectations. Failed coups and increased coup risk have significant negative effects on
the intensive and extensive margins and on overall exports. The effects of successful
coups are mixed although they generally lean negative.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that while failed coups and increased coup risk negatively impact
bilateral trade while the effect of successful coups is mixed, depending on post-coup
policies and actions of the new leaders. The results also show that coups and increased
coup risk influence bilateral trade largely through their impact on the extensive mar-
7Coup risk has an insignificant positive effect along the intensive margin in the 3-year model
(Table A.6 model 5)
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gin of trade i.e. the range of goods traded with the coup state. This has important
implications for the coup-trade literature. For one, the results demonstrate that suc-
cessful and failed coups can have very different impacts on the trade of the coup
state. This challenges the implicit assumption of equivalency in effect underlying
studies that only analyze the aggregate effect of coup attempts. The results also
show that successful and failed coups can have countervailing impacts on along the
intensive and extensive margins of trade. This is important because it suggests that
although the overall effect of coups on trade may be small, this may derive from
strong countervailing impacts along the extensive and intensive dimensions of trade.
Failing to account for these effects means we underestimate and under-appreciate the
full impact that coups have international trade relations.
Beyond this, the results show that increased risk of coups also tend to dampen
bilateral trade, along both dimensions. Policy-wise, the fact that increased coup risk
may preemptively reduce trade is particularly revealing, especially in an era where
many countries are trying to develop through trade. The results suggest that a high
coup risk may undermine this path to development so perhaps, developing countries
might want to invest in lowering international perceptions that they are high risk
locations for coups.
There are some promising avenues for future research. One interesting question to
answer is if increased coup risk deters other types of international investments such
as foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign aid. Recent research suggests that po-
litically risky authoritarian regimes with poor institutions attract more FDI than we
would expect (Beazer and Blake 2018; Tomashevskiy 2017). Authoritarian regimes
often have weak protection for investors and property rights so it is puzzling why
investors continue to send capital to these politically risky locations. Some analysts
suggest that investors may be funneling increased FDI to authoritarians in a bid
to help the incumbent hold on to power. If this is the case, high coup risk locations
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should attract more FDI. Failed coups should also result in more incumbent-saving in-
vestments form foreign firms. Investigating these counter-intuitive possibilities could
be a fruitful research avenue.
Another interesting possibility is to examine if elevated coup risk affects the poli-
cies of the incumbent government. For instance, the literature on intra-industry trade
suggests that countries have very little incentive to unilaterally reduce tariffs to at-
tract more trade and investment when the share of intra-industry trade is high(Kim
2017; Thies and Peterson 2015). However, recognizing that a high coup risk disincen-
tivizes foreign firms from exporting to the country, incumbents in high risk countries
could unilaterally reduce tariffs as a way to attract investment. Observing such be-




Intra-Industry Trade and Coup Propensity
3.1 Introduction
Classic trade is typically between industries, involving the exchange of distinct com-
modities of goods between trading partners such as the US importing agricultural
commodities from Bolivia and exporting manufactured goods in return. Since the
end of World War II, an increasing proportion of international trade has been within,
rather than between industries. This intra-industry trade (IIT) involves the exchange
of differentiated, often branded goods such as domestically produced automobiles and
household electronic appliances for foreign made ones.
In spite of this marked shift, literature on the political consequences of this change
in trade composition is only beginning to emerge. One important stream of this
emerging literature analyzes the effects of IIT on the political behavior of states in
the international arena. The central focus is to explain how IIT changes a state’s
behavior towards other states, such as its propensity to enter into preferential trade
agreements or to initiate conflict or sanctions against other states (e.g. Kim and Wong
2015; Madeira 2016; Osgood 2016; Peterson and Thies 2012; Thies and Peterson
2015). These studies suggest that compared to inter-industry trade, resistance to
liberalization is lower under intra-industry trade because domestic actors are not
harmed as much by the removal of trade barriers. In addition, a higher proportion
of dyadic intra-industry trade implies a lower likelihood of asymmetric dependence.
The lower resistance to liberalization along with an increased symmetry of trade gains
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and opportunity costs contribute to cooperation between states and fewer interstate
conflicts.
An unexplored dimension of this is whether the pacifying effects of intra-industry
trade extend to the domestic political environment. To fill this gap, I analyze how
intra-industry trade and its horizontal and vertical components affect an important
form of domestic conflict - coups. The causal logic is built on the fact that coups
and coup-induced instability become increasingly costly for consumers, firms and the
government as intra-industry trade increases. We therefore expect support for coups
among consumers and firms to decrease and government efforts aimed at preventing
coups to increase as intra-industry trade increases, resulting in fewer coup attempts.
In addition, I contend that the differing firm-level dynamics of horizontal and ver-
tical intra-industry trade suggest that horizontal intra-industry trade has a bigger
pacifying effect on coup propensity. I test these provisions for a global sample of
151 countries using commodity-level trade data over the period 1962-2014 and find
empirical support. These results are robust to a variety of controls, specifications and
alternative explanatory mechanisms in the existing literature. Placebo tests in lieu
of instrumental variables also support our theoretical framework.
In the sections that follow, I highlight the changing nature of international trade
and layout how increased intra-industry trade increases the opportunity costs of coups
for consumers, firms and incumbents, motivating them to limit support for coups or
institute measures that lower their propensity. I then present the analytical frame-
work. Results and conclusions follow that.
3.2 Intra-Industry Trade
Classic models of trade are based on the principle of comparative advantage, founded
on David Ricardo’s (1913) proposal that states benefit from specializing in the pro-
duction of goods they are efficient at producing and trading them for other goods
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produced elsewhere by the same principle of efficiency maximization. The Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model extends this basic argument to include three factors of production -
land, labor and capital - that endow states with their comparative advantage (Heck-
sher and Ohlin 1933). A classic example of this is when France exports wine to
Britain and imports British cloth. Such trade was characteristic of what has become
known as the “first wave of globalization” (Harley 1996). International trade dur-
ing the first wave of globalization which started in the mid-nineteenth century was
primarily driven by comparative advantage, resulting in strong inter-industry trade
(exchange of one type of good for another) patterns. For instance, the US and Europe
largely imported agricultural commodities, minerals and other raw materials from de-
veloping countries and exported manufactured goods like textiles, railroad materials
and industrial goods in return (Madeira 2016). Trade was therefore largely between
industries.
Since the end of World War II, trade has increasingly shifted from inter- to intra-
industry - often among countries that have similar factor endowments and at similar
levels of development. This intra-industry trade (IIT) has expanded rapidly in the last
few decades, now accounting for the bulk of international trade (Alt et al. 1996; Milner
1999). We can further disaggregate intra-industry trade into its horizontal and vertical
components. Horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT) involves the exchange of goods
of comparable quality that perform the same function but which are differentiated by
brands. This type of trade is driven by differences in consumer taste and preferences
across states (Krugman 1979). One example of horizontal intra-industry trade is
German exports of Volkswagen SUVs in exchange for American-made Ford SUVs of
comparable quality. Horizontal intra-industry trade is most common among countries
that have comparable economic development and similar factor prices (Fontagné et al.
1998; Markusen and Venables 1998).
We can contrast this with vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT), which involves the
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exchange of similar goods that are differentiated by quality. An example of such trade
is the case where China exports low-quality women’s shoes to Italy while importing
similar but higher-quality shoes in return. Vertical intra-industry trade is often driven
by the desire of firms (particularly multinational firms) to take advantage of lower
tariffs and transport costs by situating the various stages of production in different
countries (Greenaway et al. 1995). The drive to minimize costs gives firms an incentive
to specialize production in countries according to relative factor prices. The relative
abundance of capital in developed countries means that it is cost-efficient to produce
capital-intensive goods in developed countries and to produce less capital-intensive (or
more labor-intensive) goods in the developing world. However, vertical intra-industry
trade can also arise out of differences in comparative advantage among states with
differing factor endowments under conditions of perfect competition (Falvey 1981).
In this sense, vertical intra-industry trade is somewhat similar to inter-industry trade.
Prior research shows that vertical intra-industry trade is indeed more likely between
developed and developing countries (Fontagné et al. 1998; Manger 2012).
3.3 Costly Coups
At its core, a coup is an overt demonstration of dissatisfaction with the status quo
and an explicit attempt to change it. Military coups are common when perceived
government failures create grievances that the military then intervenes to resolve.
One important source of such grievance is dissatisfaction with economic management
and the general economic performance of the state. For instance, O’Kane (1981)
highlights increased inter-industry trade as an underappreciated source of persistent
coups. Specifically, the exacerbated poverty resulting from over specialization in and
dependence on primary commodity exports. In such circumstances, even the most re-
sponsible governments are open to criticisms of corruption, economic mismanagement
and incompetence, providing a convenient pretext for military intervention.
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Compared to inter-industry trade, Intra-industry trade involves different dynam-
ics but whether or not it has a pacifying or exacerbating effect on coup propensity
has remained unexplored. To fill this gap, I develop a theoretical framework that
analyzes how intra-industry trade and its components affect coup propensity. The
causal logic is built on the fact that coups and coup-induced instability become in-
creasingly costly for consumers, firms and the government as intra-industry trade
increases. We therefore expect support for coups among consumers and firms to de-
crease and government efforts aimed at preventing coups to increase as intra-industry
trade increases, resulting in fewer coup attempts.
Below, I highlight how intra-industry trade (and its horizontal and vertical com-
ponents) incentivizes consumers and firms to limit their support for coups. I also
highlight how increased intra-industry trade incentivizes governments to adopt poli-
cies that enhance political stability and reduce the risk of potential coups.
3.3.1 Consumers
For consumers, Intra-industry trade expands the set of product choices available. For
example, consumers in a car-producing country are not limited to buying varieties
produced domestically but also have access to foreign-made ones. In addition, more
variety means more competition in the market, forcing firms to lower their markups
and prices. As such, coups that limit the availability of foreign varieties on the do-
mestic market reduces their consumption utility and lowers their welfare. Consumers,
anticipating the shortage of goods in the aftermath of a coup, could stockpile goods.
This may spark panic buying among sections of consumers and drive up prices ahead
of any potential coup.
Consumer welfare may also suffer in the aftermath of a coup due to suppressed
demand for goods as people’s natural tendency to save in times of political crisis
kicks in (Dercon 2002). This may be compounded by lower consumer purchasing
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power due to difficulty in obtaining deposits from banks. Coups could also shrink
consumer income (and demand) by creating security situations that make it hard
for workers to get to their workplaces. Importantly, this lowered welfare may have
electoral consequences as opposition political parties may capitalize on this and make
it a campaign issue. Frustrated consumers may punish the government at the polls
and threaten its hold on power. This gives the incumbent government an incentive
to maintain the flow of IIT goods and services.
3.3.2 Firms
Consumer love for variety is an important factor the drives the growth of intra-
industry trade. Consumers are typically willing to pay a premium for a desired prod-
uct but the fragmentation of the market into smaller product niches means producing
solely for the domestic market may not be profitable. In other words, the domestic
market for a niche product may not be big enough to justify the often significant
sunk costs involved in producing a good. international Intra-industry trade alleviates
this problem by expanding the market for any one particular product, allowing firms
to attain the volumes needed to recoup their product development and production
costs. The associated increased scale of production reduces average production costs,
which aids firm profitability. The expanded market also allows more firms to survive
in the face of increased globalization.
Just as intra-industry trade increases the variety of goods available to consumers,
it also increases the variety of intermediate production inputs available to domestic
firms. This means firms that use these intermediate inputs for their production (even-
import competing ones) benefit from intra-industry trade. Firm-level research shows
that the increased availability of production inputs under intra-industry trade offers
significant benefits to domestic firms that use these inputs. For instance, Halpern
et al. (2005) show, based on Hungarian data, that importing foreign varieties of
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inputs increase firm productivity by as much as 12 percent. Similarly, Amiti and
Konings (2007) show that a 10 percent decrease in tariffs on inputs increased the
productivity of Indonesian firms that import their inputs by about 12 percent.
In light of this, the possibility of coups is particularly concerning for domestic
firms. As highlighted earlier, under intra-industry trade, competition is product-
based and scale economies are important in lowering costs. When countries are at
comparable developmental levels with similar factor endowments, IIT favors the coun-
try with the better institutions. Its firms can leverage these institutions to increase
their productivity and increase their market share both domestically and in export
markets, boosting revenues and profits. In contrast, firms in the country with com-
paratively inferior institutions do less well under IIT. Institutional quality is likely to
deteriorate should a coup degenerate into widespread violence. Violent coups could
destroy social and private capital and divert scarce resources away from productive
activities towards government procurement of weapons, paying soldiers and allied
rebel groups (Piplani and Talmadge 2016).
Furthermore, the efforts of coup makers to consolidate power in the aftermath
of a coup and struggles by ousted elites to regain power could create an unstable
political and economic environment that interrupt business operations. Firms owned
by or associated with the previous leaders could also be targeted for nationalization
by the new regime. In many developing countries, the most productive firms tend to
be the most politically connected so this could significantly reduce domestic produc-
tion and lead to job losses (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001). Furthermore, the new regime
could institute exchange controls that precipitate a currency crisis that hurt domestic
firms’ export competitiveness and impede imports of inputs for domestic production.
Coups may also make it hard for firms to maintain production levels if they create
security concerns that make it hard for workers to report for work. This could in-
crease the prices of domestically produced goods, reduce firm profits and decrease
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the competitiveness of domestic exports on the world market. Export-oriented firms
therefore have an incentive to lobby government officials and politicians to institute
policies that mitigate the risk of coups, such as those that provide strong protection
of property rights and the rule of law.
Taking differences in horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade into account,
we can theorize that the horizontal component is likely to have a bigger impact on
dissuading coups than the vertical component. Recall that horizontal intra-industry
trade involves the exchange of goods of comparable quality that essentially perform
the same function for the consumer. This means that in the event of any coup-induced
trade disruptions, consumers may switch to other brands. This is made easier by the
fact that horizontal-IIT goods target the same class of consumers (e.g. high income
consumers with a preference for SUVs for instance) and derive most of their sales
from consumer loyalty and attachment to specific brands. Firms may therefore loose
market share to their competitors if coup-induced sanctions, for instance, keep them
locked out of foreign markets.1 This gives domestic export-oriented firms involved in
horizontal-IIT a tremendous incentive to discourage coups and push for policies that
reduce coup risk.
On the other hand, vertical intra-industry trade involves the exchange of goods of
differing quality levels. Thus, producers often target different classes of consumers.
For instance, manufacturers in developing countries may target low-income consumers
in rich developed countries, where their goods compete alongside more expensive
versions aimed at a more affluent group. Quality differences in the goods means
they are less easily substitutable for consumers. Also, it is considerably harder for
low-income consumers to suddenly switch to more expensive versions of products
when coups limit the availability of these products on the market. This means it is
1It may also be prohibitively expensive and involve a considerable amount of marketing effort to
get customers back once sanctions have been lifted, especially if consumers have become attached
to the substitute brands.
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relatively easier for producers to hold on to their customers and comparatively easier
to lure them back once coup-induced instability has abated. Thus compared to their
horizontal-IIT counterparts, export-oriented firms involved in vertical-IIT likely have
a slightly higher tolerance for coup-induced disruptions. Consequently, we expect
that horizontal-IIT has a bigger inhibiting impact on coups than vertical-IIT.
3.3.3 Government
As highlighted previously, the potential disruptions of coups to consumer welfare and
firm operations gives governments a strong incentive to prevent coups. In addition
to this,governments also have more self-interested motives to keep coups at bay. For
one, export-oriented firms have to become more productive to remain competitive
as intra-industry trade increases (Melitz 2003; Melitz and Trefler 2012). This entails
increases in the number of employment opportunities, infrastructure projects and
other investments that these firms make. This increases the payoff that support-
maximizing politicians can expect from enacting policies favorable to such firms. The
expansion in the number of employment opportunities, for instance, can be sold to
the electorate as evidence of job creation by politicians. Also, the increase in firm’s
asset base, reflected in rising share prices and increased dividends to shareholders can
be touted as evidence of deft economic management. Bureaucrats can also build a
strong case for promotion or the expansion of their departments on the back of such
improved firm performance.
Increased intra-industry trade also comes with increased government revenue from
tariffs and other trade associated taxes. This increased revenue can be used to fund
development projects, welfare schemes and other initiatives that keep the government
popular with the electorate. The potential disruptions associated with attempted
coups threaten to disrupt or lower these revenue streams, giving the government an
incentive to minimize the risk of coups. Thus, as intra-industry trade increases, we
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should observe increased government efforts to limit the probability of coups (such
as reduced use of repression, increased respect for human rights etc.). This incentive
to prevent coups is strong regardless of whether trade is dominated by horizontal or
vertical-IIT.
We can thus test the following hypotheses:
H1: Coup propensity decreases as the share of intra-industry trade increases.
H2: Increase in horizontal-IIT has a bigger influence on lowering coup propensity
than increases in vertical-IIT.
3.4 Analytical Framework
I test the argument that increases in intra-industry trade raises the cost of coups for
various domestic constituents, incentivizing them to limit support for coups and pur-
sue actions that reduce coup propensity. Consequently, an increase in intra-industry
trade should be associated with a decrease in coup propensity. I also aim to show that
increases in horizontal-IIT, because of its firm-level dynamics, has a bigger pacifying
effect on coups than its vertical counterpart. Towards this end, I draw on a global
sample of 151 countries over the period 1962-2014. The time frame for the analysis
is bounded on both ends by data availability.
3.4.1 Measuring Intra-Industry Trade
I employ trade data disaggregated to the commodity level using the Standard In-
ternational Trade Classification (SITC) level 5, the most detailed level of disaggre-
gation under the SITC convention. SITC trade data comes from UN COMTRADE
(2018). We start by disaggregating a state’s trade into the fraction accounted for by
inter-and intra-industry trade. Following standard convention, trade is classified as
inter-industry if a country only imports (exports) a particular commodity without
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exporting (importing) it. Following Manger (2012), I also classify trade as inter-
industry if a state engages in two-way trade of a commodity but the value of the
smaller flow is less than 10 percent of the larger one (for the robustness analyses, I
recalculate these using a 15% threshold). Such trade is likely based on comparative
advantage differences between the country and its trade partners. The 10 percent
cutoff eliminates trades that are not a structural feature of bilateral trade and helps
us avoid overstating the value of intra-industry trade.
Next, we disaggregate the remaining two-way (intra-industry) trade into its hori-
zontal and vertical components. Many scholars use threshold models for this (see e.g.
Greenaway et al. 1994; Manger 2012; Weymouth 2012). These methods are based on
the assumption that differences in the quality of traded goods between a country and
its trade partners can be inferred from differences in the unit value of the goods.2 So
if the unit value of traded goods within a given product category differ by a certain
percentage, then the trade is classified as vertical intra-industry trade. If it stays
below the threshold, it is classified as horizontal intra-industry trade. Most studies
use a threshold of either 15 or 25 percent.
I use the 15 percent threshold. That is, horizontal intra-industry trade is any
two-way trade where the unit values of the traded products differ by less than 15
percent. If the unit values exceed the 15 percent threshold, the trade is classified as
vertical intra-industry trade (for the robustness analyses, I recalculate these using the
25 percent threshold). I then express the horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade
as a fraction of the state’s total trade.
2Alternative ways of disaggregating intra-industry trade into its horizontal and vertical compo-
nents include hedonic pricing approaches (e.g. Cooper et al. 1993) or price elasticity methods (e.g.
Brenton and Winters 1992). However, these approaches are data intensive and the required data is
often unavailable for many countries. Interested readers should consult Flam and Helpman (1987)
and Azhar et al. (2006) for helpful reviews of these and other issues associated with the measurement
of horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade.
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3.4.2 Coup Propensity
To construct our dependent variable, I draw on coup data from Powell and Thyne
(2011). Coups are defined as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites
within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” I code a dichotomous
variable - Coup Attempts - which takes a value of 1 if a country experienced at least
1 coup attempt in any particular year (regardless of its success or failure).
3.4.3 Controls
I include a series of standard controls for coup analysis. Prior research shows that
coups tend to be high in countries with low per capita income (Kim 2014). To account
for this, I include GDP per capita in the analytical models. Data on per capita income
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (WorldBank
2018). The number and frequency of coup attempts may also be driven by the type
of regime in power. Prior studies show that democratic regimes are significantly less
likely to experience coups, relative to non-democratic ones (Marinov and Goemans
2014; Miller et al. 2016).
To account for this, I include the Polity IV scores in all estimated models. Polity
scores measure how politically competitive a polity is and range from -10 for full
autocracies to +10 for fully democratic states. Related to regime type, I also account
for the average regime type in the region where a country is located. Gassebner
et al. (2016) show that countries surrounded by democracies typically experience
fewer coups, possibly because neighboring democracies tend to deny cooperation to
insurgent regimes. To capture this effect this, I include the average polity score for a
country’s regional neighbors. Polity data comes from Marshall and Jaggers (2016).
Previous research also shows that coups are more likely during times of armed
conflict (Gassebner et al. 2016; Powell 2012). To account for this, I include a variable
that captures the existence of domestic armed conflict. This variables is coded 1 for
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each year of armed conflict within a country. Data on armed conflict comes from the
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall 2017). More populous countries also tend to
experience higher incidence of coups (Wells 1974). I include a control for the size of
a country’s population to account for this. Population data is taken from the World
Banks’ World Development Indicators (WorldBank 2018). Coups also tend to exhibit
duration dependence i.e. they become less likely the longer it has been since the last
coup. To account for this duration dependence, I include the number of years since
the last coup attempt and its squared and cubed versions (Beck et al. 1998; Carter and
Signorino 2010). Appendix Table B.1 has descriptive statistics for selected variables.
3.4.4 Analysis
I use panel logistic regression models as the main approach to estimate the effect
of intra-industry trade on coup attempts. I employ two main specifications - one
that uses the share of intra-industry trade as the explanatory variable and a second
that uses the share of horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade. In addition to
the baseline logistic models, I estimate rare events logistic models to account for the
relative rarity of coups.
3.5 Results
We start by examining whether intra-industry trade has the hypothesized negative
effect on coups. The results, presented in Table 3.1, show that this is indeed the
case. Model 1 shows that intra-industry trade has a significant negative effect on
coup propensity. Model 2, which disaggregates IIT into its horizontal and vertical
components, shows that horizontal-IIT has a significant pacifying effect on coups while
vertical-IIT is marginally aggravating (although the effect of vertical-IIT does not rise
to conventional levels of significance). Importantly, the absolute effect of horizontal-
IIT on coup propensity is over 153 times bigger than the effect of vertical-IIT. The rare
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events logistic models are in agreement. Intra-industry trade is significantly pacifying
for coup attempts (Model 3).3 Model 4 confirms that horizontal-IIT is significantly
pacifying towards coups while vertical-IIT is aggravating although this effect is not
statistically significant. In addition, the absolute effect of horizontal-IIT over 138
times bigger than that of vertical-IIT. These results are inline with our theoretical
expectations.
In Appendix Table B.3, I lag intra-industry trade by one period to test if its
effects extend beyond the current period. The results show that this is indeed the
case. Intra-industry trade has a significant pacifying effect on coup attempts in the
next period (Model 1). In the rare events model, the effect of intra-industry trade
remains robustly negative although its coefficient misses statistical significance (Model
3). In addition, the lagged models show that the pacifying effect of intra-industry
trade is about 22 percent less than its contemporaneous effect (Model 1). Similarly,
lagged horizontal-IIT has a significant pacifying effect on current coups while lagged
vertical-IIT is significantly aggravating. Similar to models in Table 3.1, the effect of
lagged horizontal-IIT is orders of magnitude greater than that of lagged vertical-IIT
across all estimated models.
To ensure that our results are not dependent on the thresholds used to calculate
the share of intra-industry trade, I estimate additional models that use intra-industry
trade shares calculated using alternate thresholds. I recalculate the share of intra-
industry trade at the 15% threshold i.e. trade is classified as intra-industry only if
the value of imports for a particular commodity is at least 15% of exports of the same
commodity (or vice versa). Similarly, two-way trade is classified as horizontal if com-
3In Appendix Table B.2, I present Models 1 and 3 alongside models that include the share of
inter-industry trade (Models 2 and 4). The models show that while intra-industry trade is pacifying
towards coups, inter-industry trade increases coup propensity. This confirms earlier findings by
O’Kane (1993) who argues that increased dependence on primary commodity inter-industry trade
fuels coups. Note that these models are mirror images of each other because the shares of intra- and
inter-industry trade together sum to one. This means a negative coefficient for intra-industry trade
necessarily implies a positive coefficient for inter-industry trade.
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Table 3.1: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups Attempts
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT  3.44⇤⇤  3.25⇤⇤
( 6.48,  0.41) ( 6.28,  0.22)
HIIT  64.36⇤⇤⇤  59.61⇤⇤⇤
( 108.97,  19.74) ( 104.23,  14.99)
VIIT 0.42 0.43
( 0.67, 1.50) ( 0.65, 1.52)
log(GDPpc)  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤
( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.34,  0.10) ( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.34,  0.10)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.004⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04)
Region Polity 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04)
Armed Conflict 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤
(0.37, 1.20) (0.36, 1.20) (0.37, 1.21) (0.37, 1.20)
Trade Opennes 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12
( 0.18, 0.32) ( 0.17, 0.37) ( 0.16, 0.34) ( 0.15, 0.39)
Coup Time  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤
( 0.26,  0.14) ( 0.26,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.13)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.004, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.63⇤ 0.14 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.50
( 0.08, 1.33) ( 1.25, 1.54) (0.29, 1.70) ( 0.89, 1.90)
N 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286
Log Likelihood  1,002.46  999.54  1,002.46  999.54
AIC 2,026.92 2,023.08 2,026.92 2,023.08
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis.*** p less than 0.01, ** p
less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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modity imports (exports) are worth over 25% of exports (imports). Two-way trade
less than 25% in value are classified as vertical. The results of using these alternate
thresholds are presented in Appendix Table B.4. The results remain substantively
unchanged from those presented in Table 3.1 above although the pacifying effect
of IIT and horizontal-IIT are comparatively stronger while the effect of vertical-IIT
remains unchanged.
We also need to account for two important potential factors that may bias our
estimates. Incumbents at risk of coups may seek closer ties with the international com-
munity. These could take the form of entering trade agreements with major countries
or joining various regional and global inter-governmental organizations (Pevehouse
2005). These ties provide incumbents an avenue to signal their legitimacy and in-
ternational acceptance. Incumbents may also seek greater international engagements
in hope of increasing the probability of international condemnation following a coup
attempt. Previous research suggests that countries with close ties to the broader in-
ternational community tend to have higher levels of trade (Mansfield and Reinhardt
2015). This is potentially correlated with the share of trade that is intra-industry.
In this case, our measure of intra-industry trade may pick up some of this “interna-
tionalization” effect. To account for this potential source of bias, I include a count of
the number of international organizations (IO) that a country is a member of. Data
on IO membership comes from the Correlates of War International Governmental
Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2004).
The relationship between trade and coups may also be muddied by the general
foreign policy orientation of the incumbent government. Previous research shows that
the level of foreign investment is an important determinant of manufacturing activity
(which is important for intra-industry trade) in developing countries (Greenaway
et al. 1995). Governments that have a general “anti-west” orientation or have a
low adherence to western/neoliberal norms may be less likely to attract new trade
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and investment from foreign firms. These governments may also be simultaneously
more politically unstable and coup-prone. This could potentially bias our estimates.
To account for a country’s foreign policy orientation, particularly towards the US-led
global liberal order, I use the Idealpoint index developed by Bailey et al. (2017). Their
index draws on a state’s voting record in the UN General assembly to make inferences
about the state’s general foreign policy preferences. The index is constructed to
minimize noise by using information on the content of the UN’s agenda documents,
making these estimates comparable over time. Higher values of the index indicate
greater alignment of a state’s foreign policy preferences with those of the United
States.
Table 3.2 presents the results of this exercise. In the face of these additional
controls, our estimated results remain substantively unchanged. IIT continues to have
a significant pacifying effect on coup attempts across all estimated models, although
compared to the results presented in Table 3.1, the estimated effects are significantly
stronger (Models 1 and 3). Similarly, horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade
remain pacifying and aggravating respectively, although compared to Table 3.1, the
effect of horizontal intra-industry trade is significantly stronger (Models 2 and 4).
Another issue we must address is the potentially endogenous relationship between
intra-industry trade and coup attempts. Repeated coup attempts, for instance, could
creates policy uncertainty and a politically unstable environment that may scare away
foreign investors. Past research shows that foreign investment has been crucial to the
development and maintenance of a domestic manufacturing base in some develop-
ing countries (Johns and Wellhausen 2016; Thomas and Worrall 1994). Domestic
manufacturing activity directly contributes to a state’s intra-industry trade so coups
that decrease manufacturing could have a detrimental impact on the share of intra-
industry trade. The conventional way to deal with this potential endogeneity is to
use instrumental variables but finding suitable instruments is challenging, especially
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Table 3.2: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups (Alternate Mechanisms)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT  7.16⇤⇤⇤  6.89⇤⇤⇤
( 11.12,  3.21) ( 10.85,  2.93)
HIIT  110.69⇤⇤⇤  105.23⇤⇤⇤
( 169.63,  51.75) ( 164.17,  46.29)
VIIT 0.46 0.47
( 0.73, 1.65) ( 0.72, 1.66)
log(GDPpc)  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤
( 0.36,  0.10) ( 0.36,  0.07) ( 0.36,  0.10) ( 0.36,  0.07)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01, 0.000)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04)
Region Polity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
( 0.04, 0.06) ( 0.04, 0.06) ( 0.04, 0.06) ( 0.04, 0.06)
Armed Conflict 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤
(0.35, 1.21) (0.35, 1.21) (0.35, 1.21) (0.35, 1.21)
Trade Opennes 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.14
( 0.17, 0.34) ( 0.14, 0.40) ( 0.15, 0.36) ( 0.13, 0.41)
Num IO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
( 0.004, 0.02) ( 0.01, 0.02) ( 0.005, 0.02) ( 0.01, 0.02)
Idealpoint 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.34⇤⇤⇤
(0.15, 0.56) (0.14, 0.55) (0.15, 0.56) (0.14, 0.55)
Coup Time  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤
( 0.32,  0.16) ( 0.32,  0.16) ( 0.31,  0.16) ( 0.31,  0.16)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.01, 0.01) (0.01, 0.01) (0.01, 0.01) (0.01, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.45  0.03 0.63 0.14
( 0.36, 1.26) ( 1.58, 1.51) ( 0.18, 1.44) ( 1.41, 1.68)
N 3,887 3,887 3,887 3,887
Log Likelihood  848.02  845.53  848.02  845.53
AIC 1,722.05 1,719.06 1,722.05 1,719.06
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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given our multiple intra-industry trade variables.
Even if plausible instruments could be found, their validity may always be called
into question. In lieu of using instrumental variables, I follow Bandyopadhyay et al.
(2018) and conduct a number of “placebo tests”. The intuition behind these placebo
tests is relatively straightforward. Our theoretical framework suggests that increases
in the share of intra-industry trade leads to reductions in the propensity of coup at-
tempts. Also, we argue that horizontal-IIT has a bigger pacifying effect on coups than
vertical-IIT. One way to directly test the validity of these assertions is to randomly
generate “placebo” data that represents the share of intra-industry trade and regress
these against coup attempts. If our theoretical framework is correct, the placebo data
should not have any consistent significant effect on coup attempts.
We generate our placebo data by reshuffling intra-industry data for each coun-
try. That is, we randomly reassign intra-industry trade data for each country-year
observation in our sample. The results of this placebo test is presented in Table 3.3.
Across all estimated models, our “false” setup of repositioning intra-industry trade
shares for each country-year observation reveals no statistically significant effects on
coup attempts. To ensure that the results of the placebo tests are not artifacts of
any particular realization of the shuffling algorithm, we try two other reshuffles. The
results of these additional placebo tests are presented in Appendix Table B.5 and
Table B.6. Those results also show no significant effect. These tests thus support our
presumed direction of causality and indicate that any potential endogeneity between
coups and intra-industry trade is not much of a concern for our empirical analysis.
To further increase confidence in the results, we conduct two more tests. Recall
that our causal logic is predicated on the fact that consumers and firms are likely to
reduce support for coups as intra-industry trade increases because of the dire conse-
quences of coup-induced political and economic instability. One way to directly test
this is to examine the effect that increased intra-industry trade has on the participa-
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Table 3.3: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups (Placebo Test 1)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT 0.25 0.28
( 0.84, 1.34) ( 0.81, 1.37)
HIIT  9.18  8.10
( 21.58, 3.21) ( 20.50, 4.29)
VIIT  0.01  0.000
( 0.89, 0.86) ( 0.88, 0.88)
log(GDPpc)  0.28⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.28⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤
( 0.39,  0.18) ( 0.44,  0.21) ( 0.39,  0.17) ( 0.43,  0.21)
Pop.  0.005⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.001)
Polity  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05)
Region Polity 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.01
( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.05)
Armed Conflict 0.85⇤⇤⇤ 0.81⇤⇤⇤ 0.86⇤⇤⇤ 0.82⇤⇤⇤
(0.42, 1.28) (0.37, 1.25) (0.43, 1.28) (0.37, 1.26)
Trade Opennes 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.18
( 0.12, 0.39) ( 0.10, 0.41) ( 0.11, 0.41) ( 0.08, 0.43)
Coup Time  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤
( 0.25,  0.12) ( 0.26,  0.12) ( 0.24,  0.11) ( 0.25,  0.12)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.65⇤ 1.03⇤⇤ 1.05⇤⇤⇤ 1.42⇤⇤⇤
( 0.08, 1.39) (0.06, 1.99) (0.31, 1.79) (0.46, 2.38)
N 4,960 4,616 4,960 4,616
Log Likelihood  928.69  859.53  928.69  859.53
AIC 1,879.37 1,743.05 1,879.37 1,743.05
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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tion of civil society in coup attempts. In other words, if our causal logic is correct,
we should observe a decrease in the participation of members of civil society in the
planning and execution of coup attempts as intra-industry trade increases. To test
this, I rely on coup data from the Cline Center for Democracy (Nardulli et al. 2013).
I create a dichotomous variable - Civil-Backed Coups - that is coded 1 (0 otherwise)
for coups that involve the active participation of a) business leaders, b) organized
labor activists, c) students or academics and d) ordinary citizens in the planning or
execution of the coup attempt. I regress this variable on lagged intra-industry trade
(and its horizontal and vertical components) along with a series of standard controls
for coups. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 3.4.
The results align with those presented earlier - horizontal-IIT significantly reduces
civil involvement while increased vertical-IIT has a slight positive effect although
this does not rise to statistical significance (Models 2 and 4). Overall, increased
intra-industry trade is associated with a decreased involvement of civil society in the
planning and execution of coups, although this effect is not statistically significant
(Models 1 and 3).
Our causal logic also suggests that as intra-industry trade increases, governments
should have an increased incentive to actively avoid coups. Thus, another way to
test our theoretical framework is to examine if increased intra-industry trade is corre-
lated with government action to avoid coups. Since most coups originate from within
the military establishment, government action towards the military may be a useful
indicator in this regard. There is broad consensus in the coup literature that in-
cumbents seek to “coup-proof” their regimes - by fractionalizing the military forces
for instance - when faced with an elevated coup risk. Sudduth (2017) questions this
consensus, arguing with supporting evidence that incumbents rather seek to down-
play coup-proofing activity when faced with elevated coup risk since the very act of
coup-proofing could itself trigger a coup. One such popular coup-proofing technique is
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Table 3.4: Intra-Industry Trade and Civil-Backed Coups
DV: Civil-Backed Coups DV: Civil-Backed Coups
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IITt 1  3.10  2.81
( 7.51, 1.31) ( 7.22, 1.60)
HIITt 1  65.88⇤⇤  55.62⇤
( 130.84,  0.93) ( 120.57, 9.34)
VIITt 1 0.31 0.38
( 2.09, 2.71) ( 2.02, 2.78)
log(GDPpc) 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.09
( 0.19, 0.32) ( 0.16, 0.36) ( 0.19, 0.32) ( 0.16, 0.35)
Pop. 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
( 0.002, 0.004) ( 0.002, 0.004) ( 0.001, 0.005) ( 0.001, 0.005)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤  0.06⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤
( 0.13,  0.01) ( 0.12,  0.01) ( 0.13,  0.01) ( 0.12,  0.01)
Region Polity 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.09, 0.27) (0.10, 0.28) (0.09, 0.27) (0.09, 0.27)
Armed Conflict 1.70⇤⇤⇤ 1.70⇤⇤⇤ 1.71⇤⇤⇤ 1.70⇤⇤⇤
(0.91, 2.48) (0.91, 2.48) (0.92, 2.49) (0.92, 2.49)
Trade Opennes  0.19  0.18  0.07  0.05
( 0.85, 0.47) ( 0.89, 0.52) ( 0.73, 0.59) ( 0.76, 0.65)
Coup Time  0.25⇤⇤⇤  0.25⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤
( 0.38,  0.12) ( 0.38,  0.12) ( 0.37,  0.11) ( 0.37,  0.11)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.02) (0.003, 0.02) (0.002, 0.01) (0.002, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant  3.20⇤⇤⇤  3.65⇤⇤  3.06⇤⇤⇤  3.53⇤⇤
( 4.89,  1.51) ( 6.59,  0.70) ( 4.75,  1.37) ( 6.47,  0.58)
N 5,234 5,234 5,234 5,234
Log Likelihood  269.63  267.73  269.63  267.73
AIC 561.26 559.46 561.26 559.46
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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the creation of parallel military units that are autonomous from the command struc-
tures of the regular armed forces. These units are often tasked with the protection
of the presidency, with the aim of insulating the incumbent from takeover attempts
from the armed forces. This strategy also involves the creation of multiple layers of
command within the security services with the aim of counterbalancing these units
against threats from each other. The ultimate objective of these measures is to deter
coup attempts by increasing the effort required to successfully organize one.
However, this approach is a double-edge sword as it could backfire and trigger
a coup from a military force weary of being fractionalized. To avoid such coups,
incumbents may thus seek to limit fractionalization activity. Finding that increased
intra-industry trade is correlated with lower military fractionalization may indicate
active government activity to avoid triggering a coup. To test whether there is any
support in the data for this, I rely on military fractionalization data from Pilster
and Bohmelt (2011). They create an index that captures the degree to which a state
divides its military into rivaling organization in an attempt to coup-proof. This index
incorporates information on the number of rivaling military organizations and their
respective strengths. I regress this variable on lagged values of intra-industry trade
and its components along with a series of controls. In addition to linear models I
also estimate mixed-effects models to account for the effect of idiosyncratic time-
invariant country-level confounders that may affect the propensity to fractionalize
the military. The results, presented in Table 3.5, show that increased intra-industry
trade is significantly associated with a reduced propensity to fractionalize the military.
Increased horizontal and vertical-IIT are also significantly associated with less military
fractionalization (although the effect for HIIT in model 4 is not significant). Taken
together, these results provide robust support for our hypothesized effects.
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Table 3.5: Intra-Industry Trade and Coup-Proofing
DV: Military Fractionalization
Linear Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IITt 1  0.85⇤⇤⇤  0.52⇤⇤⇤
( 1.13,  0.57) ( 0.89,  0.14)
HIITt 1  7.38⇤⇤⇤  1.14
( 9.94,  4.83) ( 3.90, 1.62)
VIITt 1  0.58⇤⇤⇤  0.27⇤⇤⇤
( 0.80,  0.36) ( 0.47,  0.07)
log(GDPpc)  0.03⇤⇤  0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤
( 0.05,  0.01) ( 0.07,  0.03) (0.02, 0.09) ( 0.005, 0.06)
Pop. 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.001, 0.001) (0.001, 0.001) (0.001, 0.003) (0.001, 0.002)
Polity 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.002, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01) (0.01, 0.02) (0.01, 0.02)
Region Polity 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.004 0.003
(0.003, 0.02) (0.002, 0.02) ( 0.004, 0.01) ( 0.005, 0.01)
Armed Conflict 0.53⇤⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.43, 0.63) (0.43, 0.63) (0.05, 0.23) (0.06, 0.24)
Trade Opennes 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.03 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.02, 0.11) ( 0.01, 0.08) (0.03, 0.11) (0.02, 0.10)
Coup Time 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤
(0.001, 0.004) (0.001, 0.004) (0.002, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01)
Constant 1.78⇤⇤⇤ 2.36⇤⇤⇤ 1.08⇤⇤⇤ 1.42⇤⇤⇤
(1.63, 1.93) (2.11, 2.60) (0.84, 1.33) (1.14, 1.71)
N 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10
Log Likelihood  1,626.37  1,625.31
Residual Std. Error 0.61 0.60
F Statistic 36.95⇤⇤⇤ 35.83⇤⇤⇤
AIC 3,274.74 3,274.63
BIC 3,339.99 3,345.81
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper makes the case that increased intra-industry trade is associated with
reduced incidence of coups. I argue that intra-industry trade raises the opportunity
cost of coups for consumers, domestic firms and the government, incentivizing them
to limit support for coups and to pursue actions that keep coup propensity low. I
test these propositions and find robust empirical support. The results also show the
increases in horizontal-IIT has a bigger pacifying effect on coups than its vertical
counterpart, possibly due to the differing firm-level effects of these trades.
The results have important implications for the literature on trade and domestic
conflict. For one, it demonstrates that the composition of trade is an important
determinant of any effect that trade might have on domestic conflict. Although
previous research has established a connection between trade and domestic conflict,
an account of how the composition of trade affects the nexus between trade and
conflict has largely gone unexplored. This paper is among a recent emerging literature
that aims to account for the diverging effects of trade when its composition is taken
into account (e.g. Akoto et al. 2019; Manger 2012; Thies and Peterson 2015). The
results presented here which suggest that it is (horizontal) intra-industry trade that
is largely responsible for the peace-inducing effects of trade, illustrate that there is
still much to discover about the trade-conflict nexus.
The results are also important for the coup literature. One enduring puzzle is
why coups tend to be concentrated in Africa and Latin America as opposed to the
West and other regions of the world. Previous research has tried to explain this
puzzle by appealing to differences in the level of development, ethnic fractionalization,
military professionalism etc. This paper offers trade composition as another possible
explanatory factor. Intra-industry trade dominates the trade of western states, while
the trade of African and Latin American states tend to be more inter-industry. The
results presented here, which indicate that countries that have a higher proportion
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of intra-industry trade are less likely to suffer coups, highlights trade composition as
a possible overlooked factor in coup propensity. This is an important contribution
to a newly emerging stream of the coup literature that explores the links between
international commerce and coups (see e.g. Powell and Chacha 2016).
There is a potentially rich vein of scholarship on the link between trade and domes-
tic conflict that opens up for future exploration. For one, our theoretical framework
suggests that as IIT increases, business elites should pressure the government to adopt
policies and practices that minimize the risk of coups. Future scholarship can explore
whether these pressures go beyond coup minimization to other aspects of governance
such as increased respect for human rights or stronger protection of property rights
etc. Also, the global incidence of coups have seen a general and steady decline in the
post-cold war era. This has coincided with a period of increasing intra-industry trade
among the countries most prone to coups. Although the results here suggest a link




Trade Agreements and Coups
4.1 Introduction
Starting in the early 1990s, there has been a spike in the number of countries signing
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). This has made PTAs one of the most impor-
tant instruments of foreign economic policy-making for many governments around the
world. This has ignited research aimed at examining the reasons for the increased pop-
ularity of PTAs.1 Explanations abound but most revolve around political-economy
imperatives like competition among trading nations, the effect of increased democra-
tization, power of domestic veto players and electoral concerns (see. e.g. Allee and
Elsig 2017; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2012; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007; Mansfield
and Milner 2012).
In recent times, there has been increasing recognition that the motives for incum-
bents to engage in PTAs extend beyond the economic benefits of these arrangements.
There are strong arguments in the literature that suggest PTAs serve strategic pur-
poses as well, particularly for incumbents fearful of losing power (Liu and Ornelas
2014; Mansfield and Milner 2018; Rotunno 2016). One branch of this literature speaks
to how PTAs can be particularly useful to leaders at risk of extra-legal challenges such
as coups. For instance, PTAs can serve as a commitment device for incumbents who
have come to power through coups. Such leaders are often regime outsiders, taking
the coup route to power precisely because they cannot do so under the established
1Mansfield and Milner (1999) provide a useful review of the early literature on why states
negotiate and sign PTAs. See Dür et al. (2014) for a useful summary of the recent literature.
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legal routes (such as through popular elections, royal succession or election by party
leadership etc.).
This upsets the established order and creates grievances among the incumbent,
his supporters and previous regime elites that incentivize counter-coups and other
challenges. This is exacerbated if there is uncertainty about the trade policy pref-
erences of the incumbent as this can affect the future stability of benefits and other
rents tied to trade policy that regime-elites enjoy. New coup leaders can reduce some
of this uncertainty by committing to a set of trade policies under PTAs as a signal
of their commitment to maintaining the benefits and privileges enjoyed by elites who
supported the previous leader.
By committing to PTAs incumbent leaders can also effectively tie the hands of
successor governments since withdrawal from PTAs can be reputationally and eco-
nomically costly. This ensures that even out of power, the incumbent’s policy prefer-
ences will endure. Importantly, because PTAs limit the rents that can be extracted
from protectionist policies, incumbents can also use such agreements to reduce the
risk of rent-seeking coups (Liu and Ornelas 2014).
Studies that examine the coup-proofing capabilities of PTAs have greatly broad-
ened how we understand the political economy dynamics of trade agreements, partic-
ularly the effects of being party to one. However, the existing studies have one major
shortcoming - the majority conceptualize preferential trade agreements dichotomously
(i.e. whether a country is part of one or not) or use cumulative counts of the number
of PTAs a country is party to. This implicitly assumes that preferential trade agree-
ments are equal in their design, purpose and importantly, impact on the domestic
economy. This is problematic because a careful examination of the logic of how PTAs
affect coup propensity shows that any coup-proofing effect that PTAs have turn on
questions of how and to what extent they impact the trade of the relevant country.
In this paper, I highlight this issue and make the case that beyond merely entering
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into PTAs or even taking differences in their design into account, it is the impact of
these agreements that determine their coup-proofing benefits. I also contend that
existing arguments of how PTAs affect coups likely apply only to coups staged by
regime outsiders. Examining reciprocal PTAs involving 152 countries concluded be-
tween 1962 and 2014, together with commodity level trade data, I show that the
coup-proofing benefits of preferential trade agreements are only realized if the agree-
ment has a meaningful impact on the country’s trade. In addition, I show that these
effects are expressed most strongly for coups staged by regime outsiders. These re-
sults are robust to a variety of controls, specifications and alternative explanatory
mechanisms in the existing literature.
In the sections that follow, I start by discussing the link between preferential
trade agreements and incumbent survival and then examine how the design of these
agreements potentially influence the probability of coups in the member countries.
I then propose a new theoretical framework that highlights how the coup-proofing
benefits of trade agreements extend beyond merely entering these agreements or their
design and purpose. I make the case that it is the impact of these agreements that
generate the observed coup-proofing benefits. The analytical framework, results and
conclusions then follow.
4.2 PTAs And Incumbent Survival
This study is most closely related to previous work that examines the effect of prefer-
ential trade agreements on democratic consolidation and leader survival (e.g. Hollyer
and Rosendorff 2012; Liu and Ornelas 2014; Mansfield et al. 2002; Milner and Kub-
ota 2005; Rotunno 2016). The focus of this literature has been on unpacking the
reasons why democrats are particularly drawn to formal trade agreements. The key
explanatory mechanism relies on institutional differences between democratic and
autocratic regimes with the broad argument that democrats enter trade agreements
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more frequently due to electoral accountability imperatives. That is, political leaders
subject to electoral accountability enter into trade agreements to appease median
voters instead of vested interests that favor protectionism.
Until recently, the effect of trade agreements on incumbent survival had largely
gone unexamined. One of the earliest works to buck this trend is Hollyer and
Rosendorff (2012) who examine the effect of trade agreements on the political survival
of democratic incumbents. They argue that reductions in policy uncertainty stem-
ming from accession to preferential trade agreements increase economic growth and
boosts democratic political survival. Another example is Chang and Wu (2016). Bas-
ing their argument on the well-worn Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of international
trade and theories of inequality and regime transition, they argue that authoritarians
sign preferential trade agreements as a way of consolidating their rule by amassing
citizen support through trade gains.
The H-O model posits that comparative advantage stems from countries trading
goods produced with their relatively abundant factor of production. Authoritarian
countries tend to be labor rich so dictators have an incentive to join trade agreements
that boost trade and cause an increase in demand for the labor required to produce
the goods. As wages and workers’ welfare rises, inequality is reduced, decreasing
social discontent. The resultant political stability is good for the authoritarian as it
prolongs their stay in office. Similarly, Baccini and Chow (2018) argue that the mode
of entry into power is an important factor in determining whether incumbents enter
into preferential trade agreements. Using a dyadic dataset of 120 autocracies over the
period 1960 to 2014, they find that leaders who come to power through extra-legal
means are more likely to enter into preferential trade agreements. These leaders are
also more likely to sign agreements with strong enforcement mechanisms.
This surge in interest on how trade agreements affect incumbent survival has
greatly broadened our knowledge on the political economy dynamics of trade agree-
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ments. However, the existing studies have one major shortcoming - the majority
conceptualize trade agreements as a dichotomous variable i.e. whether countries have
entered a trade agreement or not. Others use a cumulative count of the number of
trade agreements entered into by states. By doing this, these studies implicitly as-
sume that all trade agreements are equal in purpose and effect. This is problematic
because other scholars have shown that heterogeneity in the design and purpose of
PTAs matter for outcomes such as democratic consolidation and political stability
(e.g. Baccini and Chow 2018). I examine this branch of the literature as it relates to
coups below.
4.2.1 How The Design of PTAs Matter for Coups
An emerging branch of the literature focuses on how preferential trade agreements
can be exploited by incumbents at risk of removal to aid their political survival (e.g.
Baccini and Chow 2018; Liu and Ornelas 2014; Rotunno 2016). The bulk of studies
in this branch of the literature do well to avoid dichotomizing country participation
in trade agreements. Many draw on the heterogeneous effects of the design and
purpose of trade agreements in formulating arguments of how trade agreements affect
incumbent survival. One line of argument proposes that trade agreements can serve
as a commitment device for incumbents, particularly new leaders who have come to
power through extra-legal means (such as palace revolts and coups). The assumption
of power through coups necessarily involves the circumvention of conventional paths to
power such as succession or elections. Such extralegal leaders often have a credibility
problem because they cannot promise that the benefits and privileges enjoyed by elites
who supported the previous leader will be maintained once they have consolidated
power (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). This is exacerbated if there is uncertainty about
the trade policy preferences of the incumbent as this can affect the future stability
of benefits and other rents tied to trade policy that regime-elites enjoy. This lack of
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history between such leaders and their elite supporters is inimical to the formation of
stable political support coalitions and provides a powerful incentive to plot against
the new leader and depose him (Baccini and Chow 2018).
With this in mind, at risk incumbents can seek out PTAs they can leverage to aid
their stay in power. For instance, some preferential trade agreements provide protec-
tion for adverse commodity price shocks for developing country exporters (Baccini
and Chow 2018). This protection against price-induced market fluctuations give ex-
port elites a strong incentive to support leaders who sign such trade agreements.
Many trade agreements also have exemption provisions, which allow incumbents to
selectively protect certain import sectors from foreign competition. Using this pro-
vision to protect selected import-competing sectors serves as a costly signal to elite
importers that they will continue to enjoy established privileges in the future and
gives other importers an incentive to support the incumbent in the hopes of receiving
this protection.
Trade agreements also provide an avenue for incumbents to clarify their trade
policy preferences and to credibly commit to a set of tariffs and other measures.
In contrast to unilateral liberalization, preferential trade agreements provide huge
benefits through expanded market access for exporters and protection for importers
through trade exemption clauses (Grossman and Helpman 1994). Most trade agree-
ments also allow for lower tariffs on critical goods. With such agreements, goods are
cheaper for consumers and more competitive in the marketplace. Such lower tariffs
thus build greater support for at risk incumbents among consumers and the business
community compared to the typically higher pre-agreement rates.
Trade agreements that liberalize government procurement provisions by granting
national treatment to merchants from other member states can have a huge impact
on increasing trade in goods and services between the members (Baccini et al. 2015).
Such agreements allow merchants and service providers in one country to compete
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for public contracts in member countries. Other provisions commit members to the
adoption of international production standards for traded goods. For instance, in the
South Korea-EU trade negotiations, EU negotiators persuaded their South Korean
counterparts to end the practice of demanding that production cars conform to US
standards in favor of the adoption of international standards (Elsig and Dupont 2012).
Agreements with such provisions may be more difficult to withdraw from and so signal
a greater commitment to the trade agreement for at risk incumbents (Baccini et al.
2015).
Moreover, by tying its hands through commitment to a set of policies under a
preferential trade agreement, the incumbent reduces the incentive of domestic inter-
est groups to lobby for increased tariffs on foreign made goods. For instance, free
trade agreements typically provide reduced tariffs or tariff free access to foreign ex-
porters, reducing the market share of domestic firms. This applies at any given tariff
level. This means that any price increase resulting from an increase in external tariffs
is not particularly valuable to domestic import-competing industries. This lowers
their incentive to lobby for higher external tariffs and helps avoid distortions in do-
mestic sectoral allocation of resources (Liu and Ornelas 2014). This potentially avoids
wasteful use of resources. In this way, formal trade agreements moderate the role of
political economy forces in determining tariff rates. This also generates fewer rents for
the government and so is a costly signal of the incumbent’s resolve to maintain liberal
trade policies. This contributes to policy stability, reliability and transparency and
helps reduce uncertainty in the broader economy. This can foster economic growth,
which is correlated with lower coup incidents (Kim 2014).
Also, trade agreements not only commit the current but also future governments
to the same set of trade policies. In this way, current incumbents can use preferential
trade agreements to constrain the policy options available to future successors and
ensure that even when they are replaced in office by political rivals, their policy
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preferences will endure. Withdrawal from trade agreements for new coup leaders is
fraught with challenges. For one, many trade agreements require countries to give
advance notice of intention to withdraw, which can range from a several months to a
year or two. Country participation in trade agreements also often has to go through
national legislatures for ratification, the same for withdrawals. Even in the best of
times, ratification of the withdrawal instrument can drag on for several months.
Trade agreements may also have built-in dispute resolution mechanisms that must
be exhausted before withdrawal is permitted. So in all likelihood, any potential
withdrawal will not be quick. Even if withdrawal were a quick affair, it is likely not in
the interest of the incumbent to pursue that course of action. Domestic firms may have
incurred significant sunk costs to orient their products and production plans to cater
to the markets of partner countries. In such cases, withdrawal imposes significant
costs on firms as they have to reorient their production and products towards other
markets. This could put some firms out of business and lead to significant job losses
in economically sensitive sectors. This can create grievances that can spur counter-
coups.
Additionally, because trade agreements limit the rents that can be extracted from
protectionist policies, incumbents at risk of rent-seeking coups can use such agree-
ments as a coup-proofing device. Coup makers have an incentive to stage coups so
long as the expected benefits of staging a coup (in terms of the rents that can be
extracted from protectionist policies), are higher than the cost of a failed coup. Thus,
the potential of PTAs to limit the ability of future governments to extract rents from
protectionist policies potentially lowers coup-makers incentive to usurp power.
While providing useful insights, the bulk of this literature implicitly assumes that
PTAs have a uniform impact on the trade of the countries involved. However, country
heterogeneity means that even PTAs that have a similar design could have vastly
different impacts in the partner countries. In the next section, I discuss how this is
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important for the coup-proofing effects of preferential trade agreements.
4.3 Beyond Design - How PTA Impact Matters
As highlighted earlier, using dummies to capture the effect of PTAs is problematic
in many cases. Analysis has therefore increasingly shifted towards using so-called
“depth” measures to capture heterogeneity in the design and purpose of PTAs (e.g.
Baccini and Chow 2018; Baccini et al. 2015; Dür et al. 2014). PTA “Depth” is com-
monly understood to mean the “extent to which an agreement constrains state be-
havior” (Baccini et al. 2015) or the “extent to which an agreement requires states to
depart from what they would have done in its absence” (Downs et al. 1996). This
conceptualization of depth is problematic because of the near impossibility of deter-
mining what states would have done in the absence of trade agreements. Regarding
tariffs for instance, states may unilaterally lower them, raise them or keep them the
same in the absence of a trade deal. There is no way to know for sure. This leaves
arguments based on the depth of PTAs on shaky grounds.
In addition, the closeness with which operationalizations of the depth variable
captures design and purpose heterogeneity is sometimes open to debate. For instance,
Baccini and Chow (2018) use a latent variable constructed from a portmanteau of 48
dummies that capture the inclusion of various provisions in the design of PTAs, such
as whether a PTA regulates foreign investments or liberalizes trade in services. It is
debatable how closely this proxies what states would have done in the absence of the
PTAs.
Depth measures also fall short in critical dimensions that are of particular rele-
vance to the coup-proofing properties of PTAs. One important assumption made in
analysis that rely solely on depth measures is that deep agreements liberalize trade
more than so-called “shallow” ones which do not improve market access or include
market-friendly policies that eliminate behind-the-border barriers for instance. This
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may be true in most cases because an important determinant of PTA depth is the
amount of tariff cuts states are required to make. Since deep agreements force bigger
cuts, we would expect deep agreements to have a bigger impact than shallow ones
(Baccini et al. 2015). However, PTAs also include a variety of flexibility provisions,
which enable states to respond to domestic contingencies by selectively and unilater-
ally adjusting the terms of the PTA without violating the agreement. These include
various legal opt-outs, exit options, renegotiation clauses, balance of payments excep-
tions and escape clauses.
Given the same set of flexibility provisions, some incumbents may use them more
actively than others. This is completely missed by depth measures. These optional
provisions therefore make depth measures inadequate and unsuitable for capturing
the actual impact of PTAs on trade flows. This is important because the actual
impact of PTAs on trade flows is critical to their coup-proofing capabilities. For
instance, commitments under PTAs must be large enough to significantly move trade
away from the status quo in order to be an effective tool at buying the support of
import and export elites. Trivial increases in trade in the aftermath of the trade
agreement is unlikely to adequately compensate export elites or sufficiently protect
loyal import elites (Baccini and Chow 2018). Thus, for new coup incumbents aiming
to build support among business elites and the business community, nothing short of
a trade agreement that significantly increases trade will do.
Moreover, PTAs with the same objective level of depth may have vastly differ-
ent distributional impacts depending on the practical effect of the agreement on the
country’s trade. With most agreements, exporters benefit because they gain improved
access to foreign markets but import-competing interests are hurt due to potentially
higher levels of foreign competition. At the same time, service providers may be
completely unaffected by the agreement if it does not have specific provisions with
regards to cross-border service trade. Also, the agreement may have vastly different
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effects on various industries depending on how the incumbent uses flexibility clauses
to shield industries from foreign competition. More importantly, these distributional
consequences are critical for how the agreement affects coup propensity as it impacts
where grievances against the incumbent are likely to emanate from.
It is also important to recognize that existing arguments for how PTAs affect coups
likely apply only to particular types of coups. Specifically, we can expect that the “rent
destruction” effect of PTAs have a much bigger impact on coups perpetrated by regime
outsiders compared to those from within. This is because using PTAs as a credible
commitment to regime insiders is only relevant to the extent that regime insiders
are import and export entrepreneurs or have strong ties to the business community.
It also depends on how much power and influence any such elites wield within the
governing coalition.
The fraction of business elites within the government (if any) is likely to vary
widely from country to country. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from countries where
coups are often a problem leads us to suspect that the number of such elites, as a
fraction of those with influence within the regime, is small (Farcau 1994). Regime
elites in most coup-prone countries (those with repeated cycles of coups) are often
ex-military officers or career politicians who have been in power for long periods. The
authoritarian nature of many of these regimes also means they often govern without
the broad support of the majority of the country, including the business community.
We therefore expect that any effect that PTAs have on disincentivizing regime insider
coups will be largely insignificant.
The coup-proofing powers of PTAs also partly rest on the extent to which coups
within a particular country are driven by rent-seeking motives. In fact there is some
uncertainty about how much of a role rent-seeking plays as a motive for coups. A
key debate in the coup literature centers around this very issue i.e. whether coups
are primarily driven by greed or grievances. Grievance based theories of coups assert
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that putschists stage coups against the government because they harbor some resent-
ment against the incumbent government. This is largely a reflection of the reasons
often cited by successful putschists, who claim to stage coups reluctantly as a last
ditch effort to correct various systemic socio-political and economic policy failings of
the incumbent government. Essentially, they are “saviors”, coming to “rescue” the
situation (Deutsch 1969; Finer 1962; Huntington 2006).
Other scholars argue that underlying these grievances is a deep seated greed to
capture the state and enjoy the benefits of sovereignty (Collier and Hoeffler 2006;
Collier et al. 2007). The greed motive largely reflects the rents that can be extracted
from state resources by the incumbent and his supporters. Expropriated foreign
investments, oil and mineral exports and other rents are all fair game to those who
wield power, particularly where institutions are weak. This serves as a powerful
motive for state capture. Thus, we can expect that if preferential trade agreements
have any dampening effect on coups, it will be expressed most strongly on coups by
rent-seeking regime outsiders. In the empirical analysis, I am careful to capture these
“outsider coups”.
4.4 Analytical Framework
I aim to show that the coup-proofing benefits of preferential trade agreements extend
beyond merely entering into PTAs or differences in their design and purpose. I propose
that the coup-proofing benefits of preferential trade agreements are only realized if
the agreement has a meaningful impact on the country’s trade.2
We focus on reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two or more partners
that have been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO). These reciprocal
PTAs make up over two-thirds of all PTAs and are useful for our analysis because
2It does not matter whether the country has a single or multiple trade agreements. The key
factor for our theoretical argument is how these trade agreements actually impact the country’s
trade.
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they exhibit significant variation across several important dimensions such as region,
regime type and country developmental level.3 Data on reciprocal PTAs come from
the World Trade Organization (WTO 2018). The analytical time period of this study
is 1962 - 2014, determined by data availability restrictions.
4.4.1 Measuring The Impact of PTAs
Measuring the impact of trade agreements on a country’s trade is far from trivial.
For one, most preferential trade agreements and the associated tariff levels relate to
specific commodities. Commodity level differences in tariffs affect various industries
differently and so are critically important to the overall impact of any agreement to a
state’s trade. A measure of the effect of trade agreements therefore needs to account
for the different effects of trade agreements at the commodity level.
Another complication is that some agreements relate mainly to the imports of
a country while others relate to its exports. For instance, the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) which covers a significant portion of trade between the US
and several African countries mainly relaxes access to the US market for exports from
these countries. This act is therefore likely to be felt in the export sectors of these
countries. The measure of PTA impact should therefore capture the differing effects
of trade agreements on the import and export sectors of member countries.
To develop a measure that fulfills these requirements, I employ trade data disag-
gregated to the commodity level using the Standard International Trade Classification
level 5 (SITC-5), the most detailed level of disaggregation under the SITC conven-
tion. For each country, I sum the value of all imports for each commodity from each
of its PTA partners. This gives us the total value of commodity imports from all the
3The vast majority of preferential trade agreements (about 60%) are reciprocal trade agreements
that liberalize tariffs on selected goods traded between countries. A further 29% are partial agree-
ments that marginally reduce tariffs on a subset of traded goods. 9% are customs unions and 1%
are service agreements (Dür et al. 2014).
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country’s PTA partners. By using commodity level data, we are able to capture the
commodity trade between the PTA partners and hence the commodity level impact of
any tariff reductions and other provisions associated with PTAs. This is an important
advantage since trade agreements often go beyond just tariff reductions.
We then express this as a fraction of the state’s total imports. This allows us
to account for the importance of trade with PTA partners in relation to the state’s
overall trade.4 I repeat this for all the state’s commodity exports to its PTA trade
partners and express this as a share of total exports. We therefore have two impact
measures - one for the state’s imports and one for its exports. Thus:























Where i is the country of interest, j is its PTA partner, N is the number of PTA
partners, k is the traded commodity, G is the number of commodities traded between
i and j. I, E and w represent imports, exports and the world respectively. Trade data
comes from UN COMTRADE (2018).
4.4.2 Measuring Coup Propensity
To construct our dependent variable, I draw on coup data from the Cline Center
for Democracy’s coup events dataset (Nardulli et al. 2013). Coups are defined as
the “sudden and irregular (i.e. illegal or extra-legal) removal or displacement of the
4Liu and Ornelas (2014) also use a similar measure to capture the “intensity” of trade agreements,
although it is not clear whether they use commodity level data.
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executive authority of an independent government.” The chief executive is any in-
dividual or group with command of the executive authority or government. This
includes prime ministers, presidents, juntas etc. Recall that part of our argument
is that PTAs matters most for coups staged by regime outsiders. Thus, I create a
dichotomous variable - outsider coups - which is coded 1 (0 otherwise) for all coups
staged by military actors who are not a formal part of the governing apparatus. This
variable is also coded 1 for coups staged by organized, militarized rebel groups that
are actively contesting government forces. This excludes coup staged by regime in-
siders (so-called palace coups), popular revolts and forced resignations initiated by
regime insiders.
4.4.3 Controls
I include a variety of standard controls for coup analysis. For one, countries with poor
economic indicators such as low GDP and low per capita income levels often have
poorer social and development outcomes which are generally conducive to coups. To
account for this, I include GDP per capita in the analytical models. Data on per
capita income come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database
(WorldBank 2018). The number and frequency of coup attempts may also be driven
by the type of regime in power. Prior studies show that non-democratic regimes tend
to suffer a disproportionate amount of coups compared to relatively democratic ones
(Marinov and Goemans 2014; Miller et al. 2016). To capture the effect of regime type,
I use the Boix-Miller-Rosato (2013) democracy indicator. They code a dichotomous
variable of democracy based on both electoral contestation and political participation.
A regime is coded 1 for democracy (0 otherwise) where political leaders are chosen
through free and fair elections and satisfy a threshold value of suffrage.
Previous research shows that coups are more likely during times of armed conflict
(Gassebner et al. 2016; Powell 2012). To account for this, I include a variable that
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captures the existence of domestic armed conflict. This variables is coded 1 for each
year of armed conflict within a country. Data on armed conflict comes from the
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall 2017). Coup propensity has also been positively
linked to the size of a country’s population - more populous countries tend to high
a higher incidence of coups (Gassebner et al. 2016; Wells 1974). To account for this,
I include a control for the size of a country’s population. Population data is taken
from the World Banks’ World Development Indicators (WorldBank 2018). Coups also
become less likely with time, possibly as a result of changing global trends (Gassebner
et al. 2016). To account for this duration dependence, I include the number of years
since the last coup attempt and its squared and cubed versions (Beck et al. 1998).
Appendix Table C.1 has descriptive statistics for selected variables.
4.4.4 Analysis
I use panel logistic regression models to estimate the effect of PTAs on coup attempts.
This serves as our baseline model. However, countries have unique configurations of
domestic factors that likely affect coup propensity. Some countries like Thailand have
a long history of military involvement in the political affairs of the state. The military
there is often expected to intervene with coups (Myre 2014). On the other hand, other
militaries may have a strong tradition of non-involvement in civilian political affairs
despite the existence of all the typical risk factors for coups. It is hard to capture these
underlying country-specific tendencies towards coups with any one control. Moreover,
the time series-cross sectional structure of the data means that country observations
across time are likely interdependent. Thus, to account for these interdependencies
and to capture country-level omitted variables, I also estimate mixed-effects models
that include country fixed and random effects. The fixed effects help account for time-
invariant country-specific idiosyncratic factors that affect coup propensity whilst the
random effects control for different country propensities towards coups.
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4.5 Results
We begin by testing whether mere membership of trade agreements have a significant
effect on dampening propensity for coups. The only empirical evidence we currently
have to support this proposition comes from studies that test whether a heightened
risk of coups is correlated with higher rates of participation in preferential trade
agreements. These studies do find evidence that suggest this is indeed the case (see
e.g. Baccini and Chow (2018) and Chow and Kono (2017)). However, no study has
as yet explicitly tested whether this logic works in practice i.e. whether joining trade
agreements actually works to decrease coup propensity. To test this proposition, I
create a dichotomous variable - PTA Membership - coded 1 (0 otherwise) if a country
is involved in at least one reciprocal preferential trade agreement in a given year.
PTA membership data comes from the World Trade Organization (2018).
I also examine the effect of PTA depth on coup propensity. For the depth measure,
I adopt one commonly used in the literature. This variable comes from Dür et al.
(2014) who produce an additive index that combines seven key provisions that can
be included in PTAs. These provisions capture whether or not agreements include
only tariff reductions, whether there are provisions on service trade, investments and
public procurement among others. They then sum the dummy values (0/1) of these
provisions to arrive at a total out of 7.5 This variable captures the depth of new
PTAs signed by a country.6
The results are in Table 4.1. Unless indicated otherwise, in this and subsequent
tables, Models 1 and 2 are the baseline logistic models while Models 3 and 4 are the
mixed-effects estimations. Model 1 confirms the conventional logic - PTA membership
5Dür et al. (2014) also create a different version of this index using latent trait analysis on a
total of 48 variables that capture various aspects of trade agreements. This latent variable is highly
correlated with the additive one used here (r=0.9).
6For countries with multiple PTAs, we calculate the mean depth in the year of singing any new
agreement.
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Table 4.1: Effect of PTA Membership And Depth on Coups
Outsider Coups
Logistic Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PTA Membership  0.13  0.10
( 0.31, 0.06) ( 0.29, 0.08)
Number of PTAs  0.21  0.06
( 0.61, 0.19) ( 0.51, 0.40)
PTA Depth 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01
( 0.12, 0.13) ( 0.14, 0.12) ( 0.11, 0.14) ( 0.12, 0.13)
log(GDPpc)  0.35⇤⇤⇤  0.37⇤⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤⇤  0.42⇤⇤⇤
( 0.48,  0.23) ( 0.49,  0.24) ( 0.56,  0.25) ( 0.57,  0.26)
Pop.  0.004⇤  0.004⇤  0.004  0.004
( 0.01, 0.000) ( 0.01, 0.000) ( 0.01, 0.002) ( 0.01, 0.002)
Democracy  0.51⇤⇤⇤  0.52⇤⇤⇤  0.75⇤⇤⇤  0.76⇤⇤⇤
( 0.87,  0.16) ( 0.87,  0.17) ( 1.14,  0.36) ( 1.14,  0.37)
Armed Conflict 0.44⇤ 0.44⇤ 0.53⇤ 0.53⇤
( 0.07, 0.95) ( 0.07, 0.95) ( 0.07, 1.13) ( 0.07, 1.13)
Coup Time  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤
( 0.28,  0.13) ( 0.28,  0.13) ( 0.23,  0.07) ( 0.23,  0.07)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.002, 0.01) (0.002, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 1.24⇤⇤⇤ 1.33⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤ 1.16⇤⇤
(0.44, 2.04) (0.52, 2.14) (0.09, 2.12) (0.13, 2.19)
N 5,188 5,188 5,188 5,188
Log Likelihood  778.29  778.76  764.65  765.27
AIC 1,576.57 1,577.52 1,551.30 1,552.54
BIC 1,623.39 1,624.63
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
does indeed reduce coup propensity. However, the magnitude of this effect is reduced
when we account for country fixed and random effects in model 3. As an alternate
operationalization, I create a variable - Number of PTAs - that capture the number
of new trade agreements signed by a country in a given year. This is based on
data from Dür et al. (2014). In models 2 and 4, we replace the PTA membership
dummy with this variable. Compared to model 1, model 2 indicates a much bigger
negative effect of PTAs on coup propensity. Model 4 confirms this negative effect
although the magnitude is smaller compared to model 3. Importantly, none of the
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estimated coefficients rise to conventional levels of significance. What this tells us
is that although entering preferential trade agreements do reduce coup propensity,
these effects are not significant. The effect of PTA depth is mixed, varying by model.
Model 2 comports with the conventionally expected negative effect on coup propensity
whereas models 1, 3 and 4 all show a positive effect. Positive or negative, the results
show that PTA depth is not a significant determinant of coup propensity for countries
entering trade agreements.
Next, I introduce PTA impact into the models. The results are in Table 4.2.
Models 1 and 3 show that PTA impact on imports has a significant negative effect on
coup propensity (accounting for the effect of PTA membership, the number of new
trade agreements and the design of these agreements). In models 2 and 4, we replace
PTA import impact with PTA export impact. The results are similar to those in
models 1 and 3 - export impact significantly decreases coup propensity (these effects
are comparatively larger than those for import impact). It is interesting to note
that in all estimated models, the absolute magnitudes of PTA impact is significantly
higher than the effect of membership, design or number of PTAs. These results thus
confirm our theoretical expectations - the impact of preferential trade agreements on
a country’s trade is important to any coup-proofing effect that these agreements have.
More importantly, because we simultaneously account for PTA membership, number
and design, the results confirm that it is PTA impact that is actually responsible for
the bulk of the observed coup-proofing power of trade agreements.
In Appendix Table C.2, we lag PTA export and import impact by one period to
test if the effects of PTA impact extend beyond the current period. This is indeed
the case. Both PTA export and import impact significantly reduce coup propensity
in the next period, although the magnitude of this effect is slightly less than its
contemporaneous effect. Again, we control for PTA membership, number and design,
all of which continue to have insignificant effects on coup propensity.
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Table 4.2: Effect of PTA Impact on Coups
Outsider Coups
Logistic Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PTA Impact (Imports)  1.88⇤⇤⇤  1.61⇤⇤
( 3.11,  0.64) ( 2.91,  0.31)
PTA Impact (Exports)  1.93⇤⇤⇤  1.79⇤⇤⇤
( 3.08,  0.79) ( 2.98,  0.60)
PTA Membership  0.07 0.04 0.03 0.14
( 0.48, 0.35) ( 0.38, 0.46) ( 0.43, 0.50) ( 0.33, 0.62)
Number of PTAs  0.10  0.11  0.08  0.09
( 0.28, 0.08) ( 0.30, 0.07) ( 0.27, 0.10) ( 0.28, 0.09)
PTA Depth 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
( 0.09, 0.17) ( 0.11, 0.15) ( 0.09, 0.17) ( 0.10, 0.16)
log(GDPpc)  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.34⇤⇤⇤  0.34⇤⇤⇤
( 0.43,  0.17) ( 0.43,  0.18) ( 0.50,  0.18) ( 0.50,  0.18)
Pop.  0.005⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.004  0.004
( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01, 0.002) ( 0.01, 0.002)
Democracy  0.47⇤⇤⇤  0.48⇤⇤⇤  0.68⇤⇤⇤  0.70⇤⇤⇤
( 0.82,  0.12) ( 0.83,  0.13) ( 1.07,  0.30) ( 1.08,  0.32)
Armed Conflict 0.43⇤ 0.43⇤ 0.49 0.47
( 0.08, 0.94) ( 0.08, 0.95) ( 0.11, 1.09) ( 0.12, 1.07)
Coup Time  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤
( 0.27,  0.11) ( 0.27,  0.11) ( 0.22,  0.06) ( 0.22,  0.07)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.97⇤⇤ 0.99⇤⇤ 0.75 0.76
(0.14, 1.80) (0.17, 1.81) ( 0.31, 1.80) ( 0.28, 1.80)
N 5,188 5,188 5,188 5,188
Log Likelihood  772.12  770.27  761.16  759.12
AIC 1,568.25 1,564.54 1,548.32 1,544.24
BIC 1,633.52 1,629.44
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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One issue we must address is the potentially endogenous relationship between
preferential trade agreements and coup propensity. The results here show that trade
agreements do reduce coup propensity but it has also been shown elsewhere that the
probability of a coup significantly influences whether countries sign trade agreements
or not (e.g. Baccini and Chow 2018). The logic of how coup risk motivates incumbents
to join trade agreements (as discussed earlier) is relatively straightforward but it is
less clear how coup risk determines the impact of trade agreements.7 So while it is
plausible that coup risk affects PTA membership it is less clear whether it has any
meaningful effect on the impact of PTAs. But, however unlikely it is that coups affect
PTA impact, we cannot rule out a significant effect and so we must explicitly test for
it.
Appendix Table C.3 presents the results of this test. Models 1 and 2 test the
effect of coups on PTA imports while models 3 and 4 relate to exports. Model 1
and 3 are linear models whereas models 2 and 4 represent mixed-effects estimations.
All the estimated models show that coups have a very small negative effect (-0.01 in
most cases) on PTA impact. Important for our purposes, none of these effects rise to
conventional levels of significance. This gives us some confidence that the effect of any
endogeneity bias on our earlier results is very small. To further increase confidence
in our results, I estimate additional models that further buttress our proposed causal
mechanism. Recall that we argue that PTA impact should not matter for coups
staged by regime insiders. That is, if our proposed logic is correct, PTA impact
should significantly affect “outsider coups” (which we have shown to be the case) but
have no significant effect on “insider coups”. I explicitly test this provision and present
the results in Table 4.3.
7The impact of trade agreements depend on a host of factors including the specific provisions
contained within agreements, which sectors and commodities are affected and previous trade levels
between partners. It is unclear whether all relevant factors are directly affected by coup risk and if
so, the exact mechanisms at play.
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I code a new dichotomous variable - Insider Coups - based on data from the Cline
Center for Democracy’s coup events dataset (Nardulli et al. 2013). This variable is
coded 1 (0 otherwise) for coups executed by a faction within the existing government
or cases of so-called “soft coups” where the chief executive is forced to step down
from his position under the threat of extra-legal removal. A recent example of such a
soft coup is the Zimbabwean coup of 2017 that deposed Robert Mugabe. The results
presented in Table 4.3 show that import impact has a negative effect on insider coups
but this effect is insignificant at conventional levels. This is true across both the
baseline logistic model and the mixed-effects model. Similarly, export impact has an
insignificant negative effect on insider coups across both estimations. This increases
confidence that the proposed theoretical logic enjoys support in the empirical data.
Together with the results in Appendix Table C.3, this increases confidence in our
results and suggest that the potential endogeneity of coups and trade agreements is
not much of a concern for our analysis.
We also need to address alternate mechanisms in the existing literature that could
potentially explain our results. Countries that are members of the World Trade Orga-
nization and its predecessor trade arrangements are often beneficiaries of preferential
tariffs on imports and exports. This affects the decision of firms in terms of which
commodities to produce, where to do the production and where to export (Bagwell
and Staiger 2004b). This is potentially correlated with changes in PTA impact. More-
over, the conclusion of trade agreements requires concerted and cooperative efforts
from the parties involved in terms of reaching agreements relating to tariff levels and
associated regulations. These negotiations are often facilitated by the WTO.
Also, Bagwell and Staiger (2004a) highlight the historically asymmetric treatment
of developed and developing countries under the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT). Developing countries were historically exempted from making recip-
rocal tariff concessions under the GATT but this changed with the conclusion of the
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Table 4.3: Effect of PTA Impact on Insider Coups
Insider Coups
Logistic Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PTA Impact (Imports)  1.49  1.45
( 3.52, 0.53) ( 3.55, 0.64)
PTA Impact (Exports)  0.93  0.85
( 2.57, 0.71) ( 2.57, 0.87)
PTA Membership  0.25  0.23  0.15  0.13
( 0.98, 0.48) ( 0.97, 0.51) ( 0.94, 0.63) ( 0.93, 0.66)
Number of PTAs  0.32  0.34⇤  0.32  0.33
( 0.71, 0.07) ( 0.73, 0.05) ( 0.71, 0.08) ( 0.73, 0.06)
PTA Depth  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.15
( 0.44, 0.16) ( 0.46, 0.15) ( 0.44, 0.17) ( 0.45, 0.15)
log(GDPpc)  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.33⇤⇤⇤  0.35⇤⇤⇤
( 0.51,  0.09) ( 0.53,  0.10) ( 0.57,  0.09) ( 0.59,  0.11)
Pop.  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002
( 0.01, 0.003) ( 0.01, 0.003) ( 0.01, 0.004) ( 0.01, 0.004)
Democracy  0.64⇤⇤  0.66⇤⇤  0.66⇤⇤  0.68⇤⇤
( 1.27,  0.01) ( 1.29,  0.03) ( 1.32,  0.001) ( 1.34,  0.02)
Armed Conflict 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.27
( 0.65, 1.07) ( 0.65, 1.08) ( 0.69, 1.22) ( 0.68, 1.23)
Coup Time  0.13⇤⇤  0.13⇤⇤  0.08  0.09
( 0.24,  0.02) ( 0.25,  0.02) ( 0.20, 0.03) ( 0.20, 0.03)
Coup Time2 0.004 0.005⇤ 0.003 0.003
( 0.001, 0.01) ( 0.001, 0.01) ( 0.003, 0.01) ( 0.002, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
( 0.000, 0.000) ( 0.000, 0.000) ( 0.000, 0.000) ( 0.000, 0.000)
Constant  0.51  0.41  0.79  0.65
( 1.87, 0.84) ( 1.76, 0.93) ( 2.36, 0.78) ( 2.20, 0.90)
N 5,188 5,188 5,188 5,188
Log Likelihood  344.67  345.24  339.08  339.64
AIC 713.35 714.47 704.17 705.27
BIC 789.37 790.48
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Uruguay round which lasted from 1986 to 1994. Since then, liberalization require-
ments at accession has become much more stringent. This difference in accession
requirements could mean that WTO membership in the pre-1990 period has a differ-
ent effect on a country’s trade compared to WTO membership post 1990. To account
for these effects, I include dichotomous variables coded 1 for WTO membership prior
to 1990 (WTOpre90 ) and WTO membership in the post 1990 period (WTOpost90 ).
Data on WTO membership comes from the CEPII Trade Dataset (Mayer and Zignago
2011).
Incumbents at risk of a coup may also actively seek out closer ties with the inter-
national community in order to signal their legitimacy and international acceptance
(Pevehouse 2005). Such incumbents may be particularly amenable to PTAs with
deep concessions in terms of tariff rates and other provisions (Baccini and Chow
2018). This is potentially correlated with changes in PTA impact. Incumbents may
also seek greater international engagements in the hopes that this will increase the
probability of international condemnation following a coup attempt. This could dis-
incentivize coup attempts. To account for this “internationalization effect”, I include
a count of the number of international organizations (IO) that a country is a mem-
ber of. Data on IO membership comes from the Correlates of War International
Governmental Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2004).
It is also possible that our results may be driven by a few countries that tend to
experience the bulk of coups, such as those from Africa. There was a steady decrease
in the incidence of coups among African countries starting in the 1990s just when
these countries became more involved in various preferential trade agreements. Do
these countries perhaps account for the bulk of the observed effects? To account for
this potential “African effect”, I include a dummy coded 1 for African countries in the
sample.
Another potential omitted variable that may be correlated with our measure of
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Table 4.4: Effect of PTA Impact on Coups - Alternate Mechanisms
Outsider Coups
Logistic Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PTA Impact (Imports)  1.58⇤⇤  1.27⇤
( 2.86,  0.31) ( 2.64, 0.10)
PTA Impact (Exports)  1.78⇤⇤⇤  1.56⇤⇤
( 2.95,  0.62) ( 2.79,  0.32)
PTA Member  0.11  0.001 0.001 0.10
( 0.54, 0.32) ( 0.44, 0.44) ( 0.48, 0.48) ( 0.39, 0.58)
Number of PTAs  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.15
( 0.36, 0.04) ( 0.36, 0.03) ( 0.34, 0.05) ( 0.35, 0.05)
PTA Depth 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
( 0.10, 0.19) ( 0.11, 0.18) ( 0.10, 0.19) ( 0.10, 0.19)
log(GDPpc)  0.31⇤⇤  0.29⇤⇤  0.27⇤  0.25⇤
( 0.55,  0.06) ( 0.53,  0.05) ( 0.56, 0.03) ( 0.54, 0.04)
Pop.  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.002
( 0.01, 0.003) ( 0.01, 0.003) ( 0.01, 0.004) ( 0.01, 0.004)
Democracy  0.56⇤⇤⇤  0.58⇤⇤⇤  0.75⇤⇤⇤  0.77⇤⇤⇤
( 0.95,  0.17) ( 0.97,  0.19) ( 1.18,  0.33) ( 1.19,  0.34)
Armed Conflict 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.36
( 0.20, 0.85) ( 0.21, 0.83) ( 0.23, 1.01) ( 0.26, 0.99)
log(Trade)  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.11
( 0.21, 0.09) ( 0.23, 0.06) ( 0.26, 0.10) ( 0.29, 0.07)
WTOpre90  0.05  0.07 0.002  0.02
( 0.38, 0.28) ( 0.40, 0.26) ( 0.43, 0.44) ( 0.45, 0.41)
WTOpost90  0.47⇤  0.56⇤⇤  0.35  0.43
( 0.99, 0.06) ( 1.08,  0.04) ( 0.97, 0.28) ( 1.05, 0.19)
Num IOs 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤
(0.01, 0.04) (0.01, 0.04) (0.000, 0.04) (0.002, 0.04)
African  0.01  0.06 0.06  0.005
( 0.39, 0.37) ( 0.45, 0.32) ( 0.46, 0.58) ( 0.53, 0.52)
Oil Prod.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
( 0.00, 0.00) ( 0.00, 0.00) ( 0.00, 0.00) ( 0.00, 0.00)
Coup Time  0.16⇤⇤⇤  0.16⇤⇤⇤  0.12⇤⇤⇤  0.11⇤⇤⇤
( 0.24,  0.08) ( 0.24,  0.08) ( 0.20,  0.03) ( 0.20,  0.03)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.004⇤ 0.004⇤
(0.001, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01) ( 0.000, 0.01) ( 0.000, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤  0.000⇤  0.000⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000, 0.000) ( 0.000, 0.000)
Constant 1.36 1.69 1.12 1.47
( 0.78, 3.49) ( 0.43, 3.80) ( 1.54, 3.78) ( 1.16, 4.11)
N 3,878 3,878 3,878 3,878
Log Likelihood  703.21  700.95  692.99  691.22
AIC 1,442.42 1,437.90 1,423.98 1,420.44
BIC 1,542.98 1,539.44
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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PTA impact is the natural resource wealth of a country. In many countries, own-
ership of natural resources are often concentrated in the hands of a few politically
powerful individuals who benefit greatly from international trade. Such individuals
may push for more intense PTAs. We include the value of oil production as a proxy
for natural resource wealth. Data on oil production comes from Ross and Mahdavi
(2015). Finally, I include the natural log of total trade, as an increase in overall trade
likely boosts the apparent impact of previously concluded PTAs.
The results are presented in Table 4.4. The effect of import impact remains neg-
ative and significant in the face of these alternate explanatory mechanisms although
the magnitude of its effect is slightly reduced from those presented in Table 4.2. Simi-
larly, the effect of export impact remains negative and significant in both estimations.
Overall, the results of the empirical analysis support our theoretical propositions -
beyond mere membership in preferential trade agreements or design differences, it is
the actual impact of trade agreements on a country’s trade that matters for its coup
propensity. Moreover, this effect is particularly relevant for coups staged by regime
outsiders.
4.6 Conclusion
The main proposition of this paper is that it is the impact of trade agreements that
matter for the coup-proofing capability of such agreements. This is important be-
cause until now, the coup-proofing capabilities of preferential trade agreements have
been ascribed to merely partaking in trade agreements or the number of such ar-
rangements that a state is part of. The work presented here shows that this is may
be misguided. This has important implications for the existing literature on the link
between preferential trade agreements and incumbent survival. For one, it shows that
accounting for PTA design heterogeneity is not enough to isolate all the potential ef-
fects of these agreements, particularly their coup-proofing capabilities. We need to
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go beyond design considerations and examine the actual impact of these agreements.
Beyond this, the work presented here opens up potentially rich research avenues
that explore how responsive domestic suppliers of political violence (such as coup
makers, rebel leaders and the like) are to changes in a state’s trade policy. Current
research on the link between domestic political violence and a state’s foreign policies
mainly rely on audience costs, special interest group politics or public opinion as the
primary explanatory mechanisms. This paper suggests a different pathway between
domestic violence and foreign policy - the sensitivity of violence purveyors to trade
policy changes.
Future research could explore if PTA impact has similar effects on other forms of
domestic violence such as rebellions, insurgencies and terrorist activity. It would be
particularly interesting to explore if other possible operationalizations of PTA impact
such as the number of commodities covered by trade agreements or percentage growth
in PTA trade or growth in PTA trade relative to growth in non-PTA trade have the




In this dissertation, I address three key questions about the nature of the relationship
between coups and international trade. First, I examine whether all coup attempts,
regardless of outcome, have the same effect on international trade. I also analyze how
elevated coup risk affects international trade. I demonstrate that while failed coups
and increased coup risk negatively impact bilateral trade, the effect of successful
coups is mixed, depending on the post-coup policies and actions of the new leaders.
Disaggregating trade along its intensive and extensive margins, I also show that coups
and increased coup risk largely influence bilateral trade through their impact on the
extensive margin of trade.
Second, I examine how the changing composition of international trade affects
coup propensity. I show that increased intra-industry trade is associated with a
reduction in the incidence of coups. I link this to reduced support for coups among
consumers and firms and anti-coup action taken by governments as intra-industry
trade increases. I also show that horizontal intra-industry trade has a bigger pacifying
effect on coups compared to its vertical counterpart, due to the differing firm-level
effects of these trades.
Thirdly, I analyze the links between trade agreements and the survival of incum-
bents at risk of coups. I demonstrate that contrary to assertions in the existing
literature, it is the impact of trade agreements that matter for the coup-proofing ca-
pability of such agreements. I also show that these effects are expressed most strongly
for coups staged by regime outsiders.
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The dissertation makes several contributions to the coup-trade literature. It is the
first to demonstrate that successful and failed coups can have very different impacts
on the trade of the coup state and that these effects can be countervailing along the
intensive and extensive margins of trade. This challenges existing assumptions in the
literature that treat coup attempts homogeneously. It also demonstrates for the first
time that increased risk of coups dampen trade along both the intensive and extensive
margins of trade. This is important for domestic policy makers because it highlights
the importance of managing firm-level perceptions of coup risk.
The dissertation also demonstrates that the link between coups and international
trade is predicated on the composition of trade. This potentially sheds important light
on why coups tend to be concentrated among countries that only export a few primary
commodities. I also show that it is the impact of trade agreements that matter for any
coup-proofing effects that these agreements may have, challenging existing assertions
in the literature that link mere membership of trade agreements to leader survival.
By demonstrating that increased intra-industry trade affects firm support for coups,
this dissertation also contributes to the nascent and burgeoning literature on how
international trade in similar commodities affects the domestic political behavior of
firms and whole industries.
This dissertation opens up several potentially rich research avenues. For one,
the work presented here demonstrates that the composition of a state’s trade is an
important factor in determining how disruptive a coup is to its trade relations. This
suggests that we cannot predict with any meaningful degree of certainty the effect
that coups have on trade flows without due regard to the composition of that trade.
Given the similarity of the causes of coups with other forms of domestic conflict,
future scholars can test whether this extends to other forms of political violence as
well such as rebellions and insurgencies.
Moreover, the results suggest that as emerging economies continue to develop
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and the fraction of their intra-industry trade increases, we should expect that coups
become increasingly disruptive for both domestic and international business interests.
This means that we should observe fewer support and collaboration for coups from
foreign trade partners. Also, the global incidence of coups has seen a general and
steady decline in the post-cold war era. This has coincided with a period of increasing
intra-industry trade among the countries most prone to coups. The work presented
here suggests a link between these two phenomena. Opportunity remains for future
scholars to explicitly test these propositions.
The work presented here also opens new avenues of research into the political econ-
omy of intra-industry trade as it relates to the political activity of domestic firms. The
results suggest that intra-industry trade alters the competitive pressures that firms
face, making them more sensitive to the probability of trade-disrupting domestic vio-
lence. This may incentivize firms to increase their domestic political activity such as
increasing campaign contributions or lobbying activity. Future scholars could explore
the political economy consequences of this increased firm-level political activity.
Future research could also explore what determines post-coup trade policy. New
coup leaders are particularly vulnerable to counter-coups and popular revolts. This
vulnerability may motivate these leaders to build support among the public and
business interests by offering lower trade tariffs. Future scholars could explore how
trade interacts with the increased vulnerability to coups to determine post-coup trade
policies of new coup leaders. Future research could also explore whether such coup-
induced trade policies are durable or get reversed once the incumbent has consolidated
power. This will provide valuable new insights on variation in post-coup trade policy,
an issue which has received no attention in the existing literature.
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Appendix A
International Trade In The Shadow of Coups
A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Exports (millions US$) 657,060 280 2,728 1 0.051 21 301,638
Coup Risk 657,060  0.238 0.806  1.404  1.293 0.406 2.287
Coup Success 657,060 0.013 0.112 0 0 0 1
Coup Failure 657,060 0.011 0.107 0 0 0 1
GDPo (Billion US$) 657,060 364 1,391 0.008 5.7 169 18,036
GDPd (Billion US$) 657,060 483 1,598 0.049 8.6 257 18,036
WTOo 657,060 0.781 0.414 0 1 1 1
WTOd 657,060 0.831 0.375 0 1 1 1
PTAodt 657,060 0.098 0.297 0 0 0 1
Distance (Thousands Km) 657,060 7,356 4,403 22 3,795 10,252 19,735
MRo (Millions) 657,060 1,628 10,177 1 48 848 494,428
MRd (Millions) 657,060 732 1,790 2 44 657 32,927
log(GDP)o 657,060 24.117 2.387 15.993 22.461 25.858 30.523
log(GDP)d 657,060 24.583 2.320 17.713 22.880 26.274 30.523
Common Language 657,060 0.170 0.376 0 0 0 1
Contiguity 657,060 0.030 0.171 0 0 0 1
Colonial Rel. 657,060 0.026 0.159 0 0 0 1
Common Currency 657,060 0.017 0.128 0 0 0 1
Landlockedd 657,060 0.143 0.351 0 0 0 1
Intensive Margin (Millions) 657,060 2.4 30.7 1 0.01 0.29 4,791
Extensive Margin 657,060 91 155 1 3 100 903
log(Distance) 657,060 8.653 0.809 3.079 8.242 9.235 9.890
log(MR)o 657,060 19.118 2.002 13.910 17.697 20.559 26.927
log(MR)d 657,060 18.930 1.802 14.530 17.601 20.304 24.218
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Table A.2: Basic Structural Gravity Models (No Fixed Effects)
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successd(t 1)  0.05⇤ 0.02  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10, 0.003) ( 0.02, 0.06) ( 0.10,  0.05)
Coup Failured(t 1)  0.03 0.02  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09, 0.02) ( 0.03, 0.06) ( 0.08,  0.02)
Coup Riskd(t 1)  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤
( 0.21,  0.19) ( 0.02,  0.004) ( 0.19,  0.18)
ln(GDP)o 0.82⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.83⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.42⇤⇤⇤
(0.81, 0.82) (0.40, 0.41) (0.40, 0.41) (0.82, 0.84) (0.40, 0.42) (0.42, 0.43)
ln(GDP)d 0.51⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤⇤
(0.51, 0.52) (0.28, 0.29) (0.22, 0.23) (0.49, 0.51) (0.28, 0.29) (0.21, 0.22)
WTO Membero 0.31⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤⇤
(0.29, 0.33) ( 0.19,  0.17) (0.48, 0.50) (0.30, 0.33) ( 0.19,  0.17) (0.48, 0.50)
WTO Memberd 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.22, 0.25) (0.10, 0.13) (0.11, 0.13) (0.16, 0.19) (0.10, 0.13) (0.05, 0.07)
PTAod 0.85⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤⇤ 0.81⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.83, 0.87) (0.34, 0.38) (0.48, 0.50) (0.79, 0.83) (0.34, 0.38) (0.44, 0.46)
ln(Dist)od  1.00⇤⇤⇤  0.49⇤⇤⇤  0.51⇤⇤⇤  1.00⇤⇤⇤  0.49⇤⇤⇤  0.51⇤⇤⇤
( 1.00,  0.99) ( 0.50,  0.48) ( 0.51,  0.50) ( 1.00,  0.99) ( 0.50,  0.48) ( 0.51,  0.50)
ln(MR)o  0.43⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.41⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤
( 0.44,  0.42) ( 0.21,  0.19) ( 0.23,  0.22) ( 0.42,  0.40) ( 0.21,  0.19) ( 0.22,  0.21)
ln(MR)d  0.48⇤⇤⇤  0.41⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.46⇤⇤⇤  0.41⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.49,  0.47) ( 0.42,  0.41) ( 0.07,  0.06) ( 0.47,  0.45) ( 0.42,  0.40) ( 0.05,  0.04)
Languageod 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.82, 0.86) (0.29, 0.31) (0.53, 0.55) (0.82, 0.86) (0.29, 0.31) (0.53, 0.55)
Contiguityod 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.47⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.85⇤⇤⇤ 0.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.75, 0.82) (0.44, 0.50) (0.29, 0.33) (0.81, 0.88) (0.45, 0.51) (0.35, 0.39)
Colonial Rel.od 0.92⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 0.89⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤⇤
(0.88, 0.95) (0.25, 0.31) (0.61, 0.65) (0.85, 0.93) (0.25, 0.31) (0.59, 0.63)
Common Cur.od 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.01 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.03⇤⇤
(0.18, 0.28) (0.20, 0.28) ( 0.04, 0.01) (0.16, 0.26) (0.20, 0.28) ( 0.05,  0.01)
Landlockedd  0.53⇤⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤⇤  0.13⇤⇤⇤  0.56⇤⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤⇤  0.16⇤⇤⇤
( 0.54,  0.51) ( 0.41,  0.39) ( 0.14,  0.12) ( 0.58,  0.54) ( 0.42,  0.39) ( 0.17,  0.15)
Constant 6.82⇤⇤⇤ 9.95⇤⇤⇤  3.13⇤⇤⇤ 5.99⇤⇤⇤ 9.92⇤⇤⇤  3.93⇤⇤⇤
(6.59, 7.05) (9.77, 10.13) ( 3.24,  3.02) (5.76, 6.22) (9.74, 10.10) ( 4.04,  3.82)
N 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054
R2 0.63 0.46 0.62 0.64 0.46 0.63
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.46 0.62 0.64 0.46 0.63
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05, *
p less than 0.1
A.2 The Latent Coup Risk Index
Model fitting was accomplished by estimating an initial 5,000 Marcov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) scans which were then discarded as burn-in.1 The posterior sum-
maries discussed in the results section are based on a posterior sample size of 1,000,
obtained by running an additional 50,000 MCMC scans and storing every 50th scan.
The Markov chain was reasonably well mixed, with diagnostics tests (discussed be-
1Normal priors are assumed on the factor loadings and factor scores, improper uniform pri-
ors are assumed on the cut-points, and inverse gamma priors are assumed for the error variances
(uniqueness).
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Table A.3: Poisson Pseudo ML Structural Gravity Models
Exports Int. Margin Ext. Margin Exports Int. Margin Ext. Margin
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1  0.01 0.02  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.07, 0.05) ( 0.21, 0.26) ( 0.07,  0.03)
Coup Failuret 1  0.11⇤⇤ 0.12  0.04⇤⇤⇤
( 0.21,  0.01) ( 0.15, 0.39) ( 0.06,  0.02)
Coup Riskt 1  0.10⇤⇤  0.24  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.18,  0.01) ( 0.55, 0.08) ( 0.07,  0.03)
ln(GDP)o 0.49⇤⇤  0.42⇤⇤ 1.55⇤⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤⇤  0.38⇤⇤ 1.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.10, 0.88) ( 0.82,  0.02) (1.47, 1.62) (0.13, 0.87) ( 0.77,  0.003) (1.47, 1.62)
ln(GDP)d 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.14 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.10 0.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.62, 0.80) ( 0.10, 0.38) (0.35, 0.41) (0.61, 0.79) ( 0.11, 0.32) (0.34, 0.40)
WTO Membero 0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.19, 0.46) ( 0.72,  0.05) (0.12, 0.19) (0.19, 0.45) ( 0.71,  0.06) (0.12, 0.19)
WTO Memberd 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.29⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.15, 0.41) (0.10, 0.71) (0.06, 0.13) (0.16, 0.41) (0.14, 0.73) (0.07, 0.13)
ln(MR)o  0.18  0.72⇤⇤⇤ 1.21⇤⇤⇤  0.17  0.70⇤⇤⇤ 1.21⇤⇤⇤
( 0.50, 0.15) ( 1.10,  0.33) (1.14, 1.27) ( 0.48, 0.14) ( 1.08,  0.33) (1.14, 1.27)
ln(MR)d 0.02  0.29⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.02  0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤
( 0.01, 0.05) ( 0.42,  0.17) (0.22, 0.25) ( 0.01, 0.06) ( 0.43,  0.18) (0.22, 0.25)
N 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054 657,054
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
low) suggesting that the sample is approximately from the stationary distribution of
the chain.
Table A.10 is a summary of the posterior distribution of mean factor loadings
(discrimination scores for the ordinal variables) and their associated standard devia-
tions. The items in parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals. The factor loading
on the CCS Index of -0.041 is relatively large and indicates that the strength of civil
society is huge factor in reducing coup risk. The small standard deviation and the
associated confidence intervals reinforce this, suggesting it is a significant factor.
Our takeaway is that the strength of civil society is an important determinant
of coup risk, outweighing all the other variables. Moving on to the effect of the
competitiveness of the electoral process, its item discrimination score of -0.762 is
suggestive of its important effect on latent coup risk. This is reinforced by the low
standard deviation score and the 95% confidence intervals. With a discrimination
score of -0.982, the regulation of participation is also relatively important, although
slightly less in importance compared to competitiveness. The time elapsed between
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Table A.4: Structural Gravity Models - Accounting for Market Entry Costs
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coup Riskt 1  0.07  0.04  0.04
( 0.18, 0.03) ( 0.11, 0.04) ( 0.09, 0.01)
ln(GDP)o 3.08⇤⇤⇤ 1.43⇤⇤⇤ 1.65⇤⇤⇤
(2.80, 3.36) (1.23, 1.63) (1.52, 1.78)
ln(GDP)d 1.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤
(0.89, 1.20) (0.32, 0.54) (0.54, 0.69)
WTO Membero  0.41⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.09⇤
( 0.62,  0.19) ( 0.48,  0.16) ( 0.18, 0.01)
WTO Memberd 0.23⇤⇤ 0.12 0.12⇤⇤
(0.04, 0.42) ( 0.03, 0.26) (0.03, 0.21)
ln(MR)o 2.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.88⇤⇤⇤ 1.21⇤⇤⇤
(1.78, 2.39) (0.65, 1.10) (1.07, 1.35)
ln(MR)d 0.19⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤
(0.05, 0.34) ( 0.33,  0.11) (0.34, 0.48)
Low Costt 1 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.11, 0.21) (0.05, 0.13) (0.05, 0.09)
High Costt 1  0.08⇤  0.08⇤  0.01
( 0.18, 0.01) ( 0.15, 0.004) ( 0.04, 0.03)
Low Costt 1 x Coup Riskt 1 0.06⇤⇤ 0.01 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01, 0.12) ( 0.04, 0.05) (0.03, 0.08)
High Costt 1 x Coup Riskt 1  0.05 0.06  0.11⇤⇤⇤
( 0.20, 0.11) ( 0.07, 0.20) ( 0.17,  0.05)
N 231,327 231,327 231,327
R2 0.90 0.81 0.93
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.79 0.92
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis
(with robust standard errors clustered on the dyad). All estimated
models include dyad and year fixed effects.
*** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1
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Table A.5: Trade Effect on Coup Risk and Coup Attempt
Dep. Var: Coup Risk Dep. Var: Coup Attempt
Model 1 Model 2
ln(Exports)t 1 0.02 0.07
( 0.05, 0.09) ( 0.18, 0.32)
ln(Pop)  0.02  0.07
( 0.10, 0.06) ( 0.35, 0.21)
ln(GDPpc)  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.62⇤⇤⇤
( 0.33,  0.13) ( 0.97,  0.26)
Polcon  0.51⇤⇤⇤  2.03⇤⇤⇤
( 0.87,  0.15) ( 3.17,  0.88)
Constant 1.50⇤⇤⇤ 0.05
(0.71, 2.28) ( 2.40, 2.50)
N 5,402
Adjusted R2 0.30
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.
*** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1
Table A.6: Structural Gravity Models - Accounting for Varying Time Intervals (3-
Year Intervals)
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1  0.06 0.04  0.10⇤⇤⇤
( 0.16, 0.05) ( 0.05, 0.12) ( 0.14,  0.05)
Coup Failuret 1  0.09⇤  0.08⇤⇤  0.01
( 0.19, 0.01) ( 0.16,  0.0001) ( 0.06, 0.04)
Coup Riskt 1  0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.004  0.08⇤⇤⇤
( 0.13,  0.03) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.11,  0.06)
ln(GDP)o 1.65⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 1.65⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤
(1.54, 1.75) (0.47, 0.63) (1.05, 1.15) (1.54, 1.75) (0.47, 0.63) (1.05, 1.15)
ln(GDP)d 1.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 1.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.97, 1.11) (0.33, 0.43) (0.62, 0.69) (0.96, 1.10) (0.34, 0.44) (0.61, 0.68)
WTO Membero 0.07⇤  0.05⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤  0.05⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤
( 0.003, 0.15) ( 0.12, 0.01) (0.09, 0.16) ( 0.004, 0.15) ( 0.12, 0.01) (0.09, 0.16)
WTO Memberd 0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤
(0.26, 0.39) (0.11, 0.21) (0.13, 0.20) (0.27, 0.40) (0.11, 0.21) (0.13, 0.21)
ln(MR)o 0.58⇤⇤⇤  0.02 0.60⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤  0.02 0.60⇤⇤⇤
(0.49, 0.67) ( 0.09, 0.05) (0.56, 0.65) (0.49, 0.67) ( 0.09, 0.05) (0.56, 0.65)
ln(MR)d 0.21⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤
(0.16, 0.26) ( 0.26,  0.18) (0.41, 0.46) (0.16, 0.26) ( 0.26,  0.18) (0.40, 0.46)
N 215,451 215,451 215,451 215,451 215,451 215,451
R2 0.85 0.74 0.88 0.85 0.74 0.88
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.70 0.87 0.83 0.70 0.87
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
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Table A.7: Structural Gravity Models - Accounting for Varying Time Intervals (5-
Year Intervals)
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1 0.11⇤ 0.08 0.03
( 0.01, 0.23) ( 0.02, 0.18) ( 0.03, 0.09)
Coup Failuret 1  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤  0.03
( 0.28,  0.07) ( 0.24,  0.05) ( 0.08, 0.02)
Coup Riskt 1  0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.03  0.06⇤⇤⇤
( 0.15,  0.04) ( 0.08, 0.01) ( 0.09,  0.03)
ln(GDP)o 1.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.59⇤⇤⇤ 1.14⇤⇤⇤ 1.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.59⇤⇤⇤ 1.13⇤⇤⇤
(1.60, 1.84) (0.50, 0.68) (1.08, 1.19) (1.60, 1.84) (0.50, 0.68) (1.08, 1.19)
ln(GDP)d 1.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.64⇤⇤⇤ 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.93, 1.09) (0.31, 0.43) (0.60, 0.68) (0.91, 1.08) (0.31, 0.42) (0.59, 0.67)
WTO Membero 0.07⇤  0.06⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤  0.06⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤
( 0.01, 0.16) ( 0.13, 0.01) (0.10, 0.17) ( 0.01, 0.16) ( 0.13, 0.01) (0.10, 0.17)
WTO Memberd 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.25, 0.40) (0.09, 0.20) (0.14, 0.22) (0.25, 0.40) (0.09, 0.20) (0.14, 0.22)
ln(MR)o 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 0.03 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 0.03 0.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.55, 0.77) ( 0.05, 0.11) (0.58, 0.69) (0.55, 0.77) ( 0.05, 0.11) (0.58, 0.68)
ln(MR)d 0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.12, 0.24) ( 0.27,  0.18) (0.37, 0.43) (0.12, 0.23) ( 0.27,  0.18) (0.37, 0.43)
N 130,059 130,059 130,059 130,059 130,059 130,059
R2 0.86 0.75 0.89 0.86 0.75 0.89
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.70 0.87 0.83 0.70 0.87
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
coups has a factor loading of -0.166, indicating its relatively high impact in driving
coup risk. Again, a low standard deviation and the associated confidence intervals
reinforce this.
A.2.1 Diagnostics Tests
The tables and figures below present the results of various diagnostics tests of the
estimation of latent coup risk.
Descriptive Statistics
Table A.11 presents descriptive summary statistics for the variables included in the
estimation of the coup risk index. It reports the number of observations on which the
values are based, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th and 75th percentile
and maximum values.
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Table A.8: Basic Structural Gravity Models (No Fixed Effects) With Lagged DV.
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1  0.06⇤⇤ 0.01  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.11,  0.005) ( 0.03, 0.05) ( 0.09,  0.04)
Coup Failuret 1  0.04 0.003  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10, 0.01) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.07,  0.02)
Coup Riskt 1  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤⇤  0.16⇤⇤⇤
( 0.19,  0.17) ( 0.03,  0.01) ( 0.16,  0.15)
ln(Exports)t   1 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.19, 0.20) (0.19, 0.20)
ln(Int. Margin)t   1 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.25, 0.26) (0.25, 0.26)
ln(Ext. Margin)t   1 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.23, 0.24) (0.23, 0.23)
ln(GDP)o 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.73, 0.74) (0.34, 0.36) (0.36, 0.37) (0.74, 0.76) (0.35, 0.36) (0.37, 0.38)
ln(GDP)d 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.41, 0.42) (0.21, 0.22) (0.17, 0.18) (0.39, 0.41) (0.21, 0.22) (0.16, 0.17)
WTO Membero 0.28⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤
(0.27, 0.30) ( 0.16,  0.14) (0.42, 0.44) (0.27, 0.30) ( 0.16,  0.14) (0.42, 0.44)
WTO Memberd 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.20, 0.23) (0.09, 0.12) (0.10, 0.11) (0.14, 0.17) (0.08, 0.11) (0.05, 0.07)
PTAod 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.70, 0.75) (0.29, 0.33) (0.38, 0.40) (0.67, 0.71) (0.29, 0.32) (0.35, 0.37)
ln(Dist)od  0.81⇤⇤⇤  0.36⇤⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤⇤  0.81⇤⇤⇤  0.36⇤⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤⇤
( 0.82,  0.80) ( 0.37,  0.36) ( 0.40,  0.39) ( 0.82,  0.80) ( 0.37,  0.36) ( 0.40,  0.39)
ln(MR)o  0.38⇤⇤⇤  0.17⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.36⇤⇤⇤  0.17⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤
( 0.39,  0.37) ( 0.18,  0.17) ( 0.20,  0.19) ( 0.37,  0.35) ( 0.18,  0.16) ( 0.18,  0.17)
ln(MR)d  0.41⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤⇤⇤
( 0.42,  0.40) ( 0.33,  0.31) ( 0.08,  0.07) ( 0.40,  0.38) ( 0.32,  0.31) ( 0.06,  0.05)
Contiguityod 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.46⇤⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.47⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.75, 0.83) (0.43, 0.49) (0.31, 0.35) (0.81, 0.88) (0.44, 0.50) (0.36, 0.39)
Constant 4.76⇤⇤⇤ 6.90⇤⇤⇤  2.83⇤⇤⇤ 4.00⇤⇤⇤ 6.81⇤⇤⇤  3.51⇤⇤⇤
(4.54, 4.98) (6.73, 7.07) ( 2.94,  2.72) (3.77, 4.22) (6.64, 6.99) ( 3.62,  3.40)
N 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060
R2 0.66 0.51 0.67 0.66 0.51 0.67
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.51 0.67 0.66 0.51 0.67
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). The effect of being landlocked, shared language, currency and colonial relations are estimated but
not presented above to save space. All models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p
less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1
Geweke Diagnostics
To test convergence I rely on the Geweke convergence diagnostic (Geweke 1992). This
tests for the equality of the means of the first 10% and the last 50% of the Markov
Chain from which the posterior distribution is drawn. Equality of the two means
indicates that the samples are drawn from the stationary distribution part of the
chain. The test statistic is calculated as a standard Z-score i.e. the difference between
the two sample means divided by the estimated standard error. The standard error
comes from the spectral density when it is at zero and so takes any autocorrelation
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Table A.9: Basic Structural Gravity Models With Lagged DV.
ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin) ln(Exports) ln(Int. Margin) ln(Ext. Margin)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coup Successt 1 0.01 0.03  0.02⇤
( 0.04, 0.06) ( 0.01, 0.07) ( 0.05, 0.001)
Coup Failuret 1  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.04⇤  0.04⇤⇤⇤
( 0.13,  0.03) ( 0.09, 0.002) ( 0.06,  0.01)
Coup Riskt 1  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.02  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.12,  0.04) ( 0.05, 0.02) ( 0.09,  0.04)
ln(Exports)t   1 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.12, 0.13) (0.12, 0.13)
ln(Int. Margin)t   1 0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤
(0.16, 0.18) (0.16, 0.18)
ln(Ext. Margin)t   1 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.13, 0.14) (0.13, 0.14)
ln(GDP)o 1.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.99⇤⇤⇤ 1.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.99⇤⇤⇤
(1.39, 1.57) (0.41, 0.54) (0.94, 1.03) (1.39, 1.57) (0.41, 0.54) (0.94, 1.03)
ln(GDP)d 0.95⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.94⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.57⇤⇤⇤
(0.89, 1.01) (0.33, 0.41) (0.54, 0.61) (0.88, 1.00) (0.32, 0.40) (0.53, 0.60)
WTO Membero 0.10⇤⇤⇤  0.03 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤  0.03 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.04, 0.17) ( 0.08, 0.02) (0.11, 0.16) (0.04, 0.17) ( 0.08, 0.02) (0.11, 0.16)
WTO Memberd 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.21, 0.33) (0.09, 0.17) (0.11, 0.17) (0.22, 0.33) (0.09, 0.17) (0.11, 0.18)
ln(MR)o 0.48⇤⇤⇤  0.04 0.52⇤⇤⇤ 0.48⇤⇤⇤  0.04 0.52⇤⇤⇤
(0.40, 0.56) ( 0.09, 0.02) (0.48, 0.56) (0.40, 0.56) ( 0.09, 0.02) (0.48, 0.56)
ln(MR)d 0.21⇤⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.17, 0.24) ( 0.17,  0.11) (0.35, 0.39) (0.17, 0.24) ( 0.17,  0.11) (0.34, 0.38)
N 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060 657,060
R2 0.84 0.73 0.88 0.84 0.73 0.88
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.72 0.88 0.83 0.72 0.88
OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis (with robust standard errors clustered on
the dyad). All estimated models include dyad and year fixed effects. *** p less than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05,
* p less than 0.1
Table A.10: Posterior Density Summary of the Measurement Model of Coup Risk
Indicator Mean St. Dev.






log(Coup Spell)  0.16584 0.06853
[ 0.3011,  0.034067]
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Table A.11: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
CCS Index 11,123 0.530 0.316 0.010 0.232 0.853 0.979
log(CCS Index) 11,123  0.947 0.950  4.652  1.461  0.158  0.021
Competitiveness 8,785 2.828 1.565 0.000 1.000 4.000 5.000
Participation 8,785 3.585 1.078 1.000 3.000 4.000 5.000
Coup Spell 10,875 26.387 20.408 1.000 9.000 41.000 72.000
log(Coup Spell) 10,875 2.845 1.073 0.000 2.197 3.714 4.277
into account. The expected outcome is to have 95% of the values between -2 and 2.
As Figure A.1 below shows, all the posterior draws for the various components are


















Figure A.1: Geweke Diagnostics
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Density Plot
Figure A.2 presents a density plot of the values and the shape of the posterior
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Figure A.2: Density Plot
Trace Plot
Figure A.3 presents a trace plot of the index components. Trace plots are useful for
assessing convergence and diagnosing chain problems. It is essentially a time series
of the sampling process. As the plot shows, all the various components achieved
convergence, evidenced by the relatively flat “white-noise” nature of each plot.
Running Mean Plot
Figure A.4 presents a running mean plot of the index components. Running mean
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Figure A.3: Trace Plot
mean). In each plot, the horizontal line is the mean of the chain. The plot indicates
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Figure A.4: Running Mean Plot
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Appendix B
Intra-Industry Trade and Coup Propensity
B.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables. It reports the num-
ber of observations on which the values are based, the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, 25th and 75th percentile and maximum values.
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Coup Attempt 7,917 0.087 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
IIT10%Threshold 9,263 0.067 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.500
Inter-IT10%Threshold 9,263 0.933 0.112 0.500 0.924 1.000 1.000
IIT15%Threshold 9,263 0.057 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.458
Inter-IT15%Threshold 9,263 0.943 0.100 0.542 0.938 1.000 1.000
HIIT15%Threshold 9,263 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.176
HIIT25%Threshold 9,263 0.008 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.177
VIIT15%Threshold 9,263 0.659 0.144 0.500 0.500 0.760 0.998
VIIT25%Threshold 9,263 0.656 0.144 0.500 0.500 0.758 0.998
log(GDP) 7,917 2.195 2.412  4.730 0.371 3.871 9.764
log(GDPpc) 7,917 7.263 1.685 1.964 5.881 8.466 11.667
Pop. (millions) 7,917 31.856 117.711 0.009 2.551 18.569 1,364.270
Armed Conflict 7,219 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Coup Time 7,917 27.853 20.538 1.000 9.000 45.000 69.000
Polity 8,140 0.774 7.286  10.000  7.000 8.000 10.000
Region Polity 9,891  0.033 4.805  8.000  3.824 3.353 10.000
Num IO 6,766 48.817 21.169 1.000 34.000 61.000 129.000
Idealpoint 7,447  0.033 0.886  2.445  0.640 0.697 3.004
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B.2 Additional Tables
Table B.2: Intra and Inter-Industry Trade Effect On Coups
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intra-Ind. Trade  3.44⇤⇤  3.25⇤⇤
( 6.48,  0.41) ( 6.28,  0.22)
Inter-Ind. Trade 3.44⇤⇤ 3.25⇤⇤
(0.41, 6.48) (0.22, 6.28)
log(GDPpc)  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤
( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.35,  0.13)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04)
Region Polity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.04)
Armed Conflict 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤
(0.37, 1.20) (0.37, 1.20) (0.37, 1.21) (0.37, 1.21)
Trade Opennes 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09
( 0.18, 0.32) ( 0.18, 0.32) ( 0.16, 0.34) ( 0.16, 0.34)
Coup Time  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤
( 0.26,  0.14) ( 0.26,  0.14) ( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.13)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.004, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.63⇤  2.82⇤ 1.00⇤⇤⇤  2.25
( 0.08, 1.33) ( 6.03, 0.40) (0.29, 1.70) ( 5.47, 0.96)
N 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286
Log Likelihood  1,002.46  1,002.46  1,002.46  1,002.46
AIC 2,026.92 2,026.92 2,026.92 2,026.92
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis.*** p less than 0.01, ** p
less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Table B.3: Intra-Ind. Trade and Coup Attempts (Lagged)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IITt 1  2.71⇤  2.51
( 5.73, 0.31) ( 5.53, 0.51)
HIITt 1  38.49⇤  34.36⇤
( 77.87, 0.89) ( 73.74, 5.02)
VIITt 1 1.31⇤⇤⇤ 1.31⇤⇤⇤
(0.35, 2.27) (0.35, 2.27)
log(GDPpc)  0.27⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤  0.26⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤
( 0.38,  0.16) ( 0.33,  0.10) ( 0.37,  0.15) ( 0.33,  0.10)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.004⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.004⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01, 0.000)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05)
Region Polity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.04, 0.05)
Armed Conflict 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.36, 1.20) (0.33, 1.17) (0.37, 1.20) (0.34, 1.18)
Trade Opennes 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.22⇤
( 0.16, 0.35) ( 0.05, 0.46) ( 0.14, 0.36) ( 0.03, 0.47)
Coup Time  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤
( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.24,  0.12) ( 0.25,  0.12) ( 0.24,  0.12)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.71⇤  0.67 1.08⇤⇤⇤  0.29
( 0.01, 1.42) ( 1.93, 0.59) (0.37, 1.80) ( 1.55, 0.97)
N 5,234 5,234 5,234 5,234
Log Likelihood  988.35  984.48  988.35  984.48
AIC 1,998.70 1,992.96 1,998.70 1,992.96
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis.*** p less than 0.01, ** p
less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Table B.4: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups (Alternate Thresholds)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT  4.55⇤⇤  4.29⇤⇤
( 8.19,  0.92) ( 7.93,  0.66)
HIIT  43.68⇤⇤⇤  40.91⇤⇤⇤
( 72.54,  14.81) ( 69.77,  12.04)
VIIT 0.42 0.43
( 0.67, 1.50) ( 0.65, 1.51)
log(GDPpc)  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤  0.24⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤
( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.33,  0.10) ( 0.35,  0.13) ( 0.33,  0.10)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.004⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.000)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.06⇤⇤⇤
( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04) ( 0.09,  0.04)
Region Polity 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.04, 0.05)
Armed Conflict 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 0.80⇤⇤⇤
(0.37, 1.21) (0.37, 1.21) (0.38, 1.21) (0.38, 1.21)
Trade Opennes 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12
( 0.18, 0.32) ( 0.17, 0.36) ( 0.17, 0.34) ( 0.15, 0.38)
Coup Time  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤
( 0.26,  0.14) ( 0.26,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.13)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.004, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.61⇤ 0.15 0.98⇤⇤⇤ 0.51
( 0.09, 1.32) ( 1.25, 1.55) (0.28, 1.69) ( 0.89, 1.90)
N 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286
Log Likelihood  1,001.72  999.09  1,001.72  999.09
AIC 2,025.44 2,022.18 2,025.44 2,022.18
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. IIT is calculated at the
15 percent threshold. HIIT and VIIT calcuated at the 25 percent threshold. *** p less
than 0.01, ** p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Table B.5: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups (Placebo Test 2)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT 0.07 0.10
( 1.02, 1.15) ( 0.99, 1.18)
HIIT 3.96 4.56
( 7.66, 15.59) ( 7.06, 16.18)
VIIT 0.21 0.22
( 0.67, 1.08) ( 0.66, 1.09)
log(GDPpc)  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.28⇤⇤⇤  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.27⇤⇤⇤
( 0.41,  0.19) ( 0.39,  0.16) ( 0.41,  0.19) ( 0.39,  0.16)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.002) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.002)
Polity  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.09⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.11,  0.06) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.11,  0.06)
Region Polity 0.002 0.02 0.002 0.02
( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.03, 0.06) ( 0.04, 0.05) ( 0.03, 0.06)
Armed Conflict 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.87⇤⇤⇤ 0.85⇤⇤⇤ 0.88⇤⇤⇤
(0.41, 1.27) (0.43, 1.31) (0.42, 1.27) (0.44, 1.32)
Trade Opennes 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13
( 0.16, 0.37) ( 0.14, 0.38) ( 0.14, 0.38) ( 0.12, 0.39)
Coup Time  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.21⇤⇤⇤
( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.28,  0.14) ( 0.25,  0.12) ( 0.28,  0.14)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.80⇤⇤ 0.61 1.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.98⇤⇤
(0.06, 1.54) ( 0.35, 1.57) (0.46, 1.94) (0.03, 1.94)
N 4,943 4,621 4,943 4,621
Log Likelihood  923.58  859.21  923.58  859.21
AIC 1,869.15 1,742.43 1,869.15 1,742.43
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Table B.6: Intra-Industry Trade and Coups (Placebo Test 3)
DV: Coup Attempts DV: Coup Attempts
Logistic Rare Events Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IIT  0.43  0.40
( 1.53, 0.67) ( 1.50, 0.70)
HIIT 6.89 7.25
( 4.20, 17.99) ( 3.84, 18.35)
VIIT 0.04 0.05
( 0.83, 0.90) ( 0.82, 0.91)
log(GDPpc)  0.29⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤  0.29⇤⇤⇤  0.32⇤⇤⇤
( 0.39,  0.18) ( 0.43,  0.21) ( 0.39,  0.18) ( 0.43,  0.21)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001)
Polity  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤⇤
( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.11,  0.05) ( 0.10,  0.05) ( 0.11,  0.05)
Region Polity  0.003 0.02  0.003 0.02
( 0.05, 0.04) ( 0.03, 0.06) ( 0.04, 0.04) ( 0.03, 0.06)
Armed Conflict 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.30, 1.17) (0.30, 1.20) (0.31, 1.18) (0.31, 1.21)
Trade Opennes 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.19
( 0.12, 0.38) ( 0.07, 0.42) ( 0.10, 0.39) ( 0.06, 0.43)
Coup Time  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤⇤
( 0.25,  0.13) ( 0.26,  0.13) ( 0.25,  0.12) ( 0.25,  0.12)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.004, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.83⇤⇤ 0.91⇤ 1.17⇤⇤⇤ 1.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.11, 1.55) ( 0.04, 1.86) (0.45, 1.89) (0.35, 2.24)
N 4,959 4,644 4,959 4,644
Log Likelihood  958.21  875.82  958.21  875.82
AIC 1,938.42 1,775.64 1,938.42 1,775.64
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Appendix C
Trade Agreements and coups
C.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables. It reports the num-
ber of observations on which the values are based, the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, 25th and 75th percentile and maximum values.
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
PTA Impact (Exports) 5,188 0.220 0.304 0 0 0.5 1
PTA Impact (Imports) 5,188 0.228 0.292 0 0 0.5 1
PTA Depth 5,188 0.873 1.738 0 0 1 7
log(GDPpc) 5,188 7.626 1.667 3.362 6.275 8.882 11.667
Pop. (Millions) 5,188 37.888 127.577 0.130 3.609 27.667 1,364.270
Democracy 5,188 0.543 0.498 0 0 1 1
Armed Conflict 5,188 0.037 0.190 0 0 0 1
Coup Time 5,188 30.260 20.909 1 11 49 69
African 5,188 0.268 0.443 0 0 1 1
Outsider Coup 5,188 0.046 0.210 0 0 0 1
Insider Coup 5,188 0.015 0.121 0 0 0 1
PTA Member 5,188 0.105 0.307 0 0 0 1
Number of PTAs 5,188 0.814 1.787 0 0 1 26
WTOpre90 3,878 0.355 0.479 0 0 1 1
WTOpost90 3,878 0.358 0.479 0 0 1 1
Num IOs 3,878 57.812 20.138 13 43 71 129
Oil Prod. (Billions US$) 3,878 6.6 23.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 384.7
log(Trade) 3,878 22.333 2.574 14.767 20.587 24.192 30.054
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.2: Lagged PTA Impact on Coups
Outsider Coups
Logistic Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PTA Impact (Imports)t 1  1.60⇤⇤⇤  1.48⇤⇤
( 2.82,  0.39) ( 2.79,  0.17)
PTA Impact (Exports)t 1  1.22⇤⇤  1.12⇤⇤
( 2.22,  0.21) ( 2.21,  0.02)
PTA Membership  0.09  0.04  0.03 0.01
( 0.52, 0.34) ( 0.48, 0.40) ( 0.52, 0.46) ( 0.48, 0.51)
Number of PTAs  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.08
( 0.27, 0.10) ( 0.28, 0.09) ( 0.25, 0.11) ( 0.26, 0.11)
PTA Depth 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
( 0.09, 0.17) ( 0.10, 0.15) ( 0.08, 0.18) ( 0.09, 0.16)
log(GDPpc)  0.29⇤⇤⇤  0.30⇤⇤⇤  0.33⇤⇤⇤  0.35⇤⇤⇤
( 0.42,  0.15) ( 0.43,  0.16) ( 0.50,  0.16) ( 0.52,  0.17)
Pop.  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01  0.01
( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01,  0.001) ( 0.01, 0.002) ( 0.01, 0.002)
Democracy  0.53⇤⇤⇤  0.54⇤⇤⇤  0.75⇤⇤⇤  0.77⇤⇤⇤
( 0.89,  0.16) ( 0.90,  0.18) ( 1.15,  0.34) ( 1.17,  0.37)
Armed Conflict 0.46⇤ 0.47⇤ 0.50 0.50
( 0.05, 0.98) ( 0.05, 0.98) ( 0.12, 1.12) ( 0.12, 1.12)
Coup Time  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤⇤
( 0.29,  0.12) ( 0.29,  0.12) ( 0.24,  0.06) ( 0.24,  0.06)
Coup Time2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.01) (0.003, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01) (0.001, 0.01)
Coup Time3  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Constant 0.94⇤⇤ 1.01⇤⇤ 0.69 0.80
(0.08, 1.81) (0.15, 1.87) ( 0.44, 1.82) ( 0.32, 1.91)
N 4,884 4,884 4,884 4,884
Log Likelihood  716.09  716.80  704.34  704.85
AIC 1,456.17 1,457.59 1,434.69 1,435.70
BIC 1,519.11 1,520.11
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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Table C.3: Effect of Coups on PTAs (Reverse Causal Models)
PTA Impact (Imports) PTA Impact (Exports)
Linear Mixed-Effects Linear Mixed-Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Outsider Coups  0.005  0.004  0.01  0.01
( 0.03, 0.02) ( 0.02, 0.02) ( 0.04, 0.02) ( 0.04, 0.01)
log(GDPpc) 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.02, 0.03) (0.02, 0.04) (0.01, 0.03) (0.01, 0.03)
Pop.  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤  0.000⇤⇤⇤
( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.001,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000) ( 0.000,  0.000)
Democracy 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.02⇤⇤  0.004
(0.01, 0.04) ( 0.01, 0.03) (0.003, 0.04) ( 0.02, 0.02)
Armed Conflict  0.01  0.02⇤  0.02  0.03
( 0.04, 0.02) ( 0.05, 0.005) ( 0.06, 0.01) ( 0.06, 0.01)
WTOpre90  0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.01  0.03⇤⇤⇤  0.01
( 0.05,  0.02) ( 0.01, 0.03) ( 0.05,  0.02) ( 0.03, 0.01)
WTOpost90  0.02⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤  0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤
( 0.04,  0.003) (0.05, 0.09) ( 0.09,  0.04) (0.01, 0.06)
Num IOs 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤
(0.01, 0.01) (0.003, 0.004) (0.01, 0.01) (0.002, 0.004)
African 0.02⇤  0.02  0.03⇤⇤⇤  0.11⇤⇤⇤
( 0.002, 0.04) ( 0.09, 0.04) ( 0.05,  0.01) ( 0.17,  0.05)
Oil Prod.  0.00⇤⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤
( 0.00,  0.00) ( 0.00,  0.00) ( 0.00,  0.00) ( 0.00,  0.00)
Coup Time 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.003, 0.003) (0.001, 0.002) (0.002, 0.003) (0.000, 0.002)
Constant  0.43⇤⇤⇤  0.27⇤⇤⇤  0.34⇤⇤⇤  0.12⇤⇤⇤
( 0.48,  0.39) ( 0.34,  0.20) ( 0.38,  0.29) ( 0.20,  0.04)
N 3,878 3,878 3,878 3,878
R2 0.45 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.35
Log Likelihood 1,732.48 1,134.92
Residual Std. Error 0.20 0.22
F Statistic 288.39⇤⇤⇤ 193.81⇤⇤⇤
AIC  3,436.96  2,241.83
BIC  3,349.28  2,154.15
Coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis. *** p less than 0.01, **
p less than 0.05, * p less than 0.1.
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